Exposed secret literal
- Finding
- File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.
Security checks across static analysis, malware telemetry, and agentic risk
This appears to be a private OpenClaw server runbook that exposes real-looking passwords/API tokens and can upload local skills to a fixed remote server.
Only use this if the server and all listed credentials are yours and you understand the remote-control implications. Before installing or running commands, rotate the exposed secrets, replace hardcoded values with your own secret-managed credentials, restrict the gateway network exposure, and review any files before uploading them to the remote server.
VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Anyone with the skill text could try to access the server, gateway, and paid/provider accounts, and the legitimate owner may face account compromise or unexpected usage charges.
The skill exposes direct root server access plus gateway and model-provider credentials, while the registry declares no credentials or env vars.
远程服务器 IP `47.115.54.84`; SSH 用户名 `root`; SSH 密码 `Davinci...`; Gateway Token `f9df...`; API Key `sk-sp-...`
Do not use this as a public skill. Rotate/revoke all exposed secrets, remove hardcoded credentials, and require users to supply their own credentials through a secret store or environment variables.
Local skills may contain private code, prompts, tokens, or business logic and could be transferred to a server the installing user does not control.
The workflow packages every local skill and uploads it to a fixed remote server using a hardcoded root password.
cd ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/; tar -czf skills.tar.gz */; sshpass -p 'Davinci...' scp skills.tar.gz root@47.115.54.84:/opt/openclaw/skills/
Do not run the sync command automatically. Review exactly what will be archived, use a user-owned destination, avoid sshpass, and restrict uploads to explicitly selected files.
If the token is known and the service is reachable, other parties may be able to interact with or control the OpenClaw gateway and connected devices/channels.
The gateway is configured for LAN binding with wildcard browser origins, and the token is hardcoded in the published artifacts.
"bind": "lan", "auth": {"mode": "token", "token": "f9df..."}, "controlUi": {"allowedOrigins": ["*"]}Rotate the gateway token, bind to localhost or a VPN-only interface, restrict allowed origins, and firewall the gateway to trusted clients only.
A deployment could install unexpected code or change behavior over time, especially when run inside a persistent remote gateway.
The guide says the package is internal/non-public but still instructs npm installation, creating a provenance and package-confusion risk; SKILL.md also uses an unpinned Docker image tag.
Browser Relay (@openclaw/browser-relay) 是 OpenClaw 内部包,不在 npm 公开仓库中 ... npm install @openclaw/browser-relay
Use verified package sources, pin exact versions or digests, and avoid installing internal package names from public registries unless provenance is confirmed.
Services and tunnels may continue running after the initial task, keeping remote access paths active.
The skill intentionally creates long-running gateway/container and tunnel behavior, which is disclosed and purpose-aligned but persistent.
docker run -d ... --restart always ...; ssh -f -N -L 18790:localhost:18789 root@47.115.54.84
Track the created container, background processes, and tunnels, and stop or remove them when no longer needed.