Naver Writer ACP

PendingStatic analysis audit pending.

Overview

No static analysis result has been recorded yet. Pattern checks will appear here once the artifact has been analyzed.

Findings (0)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

If admin credentials are present in the environment, a publish job may be sent through an internal/admin path instead of the marketplace offering path, bypassing normal scoped execution and billing/tracking controls.

Why it was flagged

The normal publish script can use ACP admin credentials to call a direct dispatch endpoint if the preferred offering execute URL is absent.

Skill content
ADMIN_KEY_RAW="${ACP_ADMIN_API_KEY:-${ACP_CONTROL_PLANE_API_KEYS:-}}" ... "${CONTROL_PLANE_URL%/}/v2/jobs/dispatch-and-wait"
Recommendation

Remove the admin fallback from the public skill or require a separate explicit debug command/flag with clear warnings, scoped credentials, and user confirmation.

What this means

Setup depends on code fetched or resolved outside this skill package, so the reviewed artifacts do not fully show what the thin runner will do during setup/login.

Why it was flagged

The setup flow executes an external npm package without a pinned version in the reviewed artifacts.

Skill content
runner_cmd=(npx @y80163442/naver-thin-runner setup)
Recommendation

Pin the runner package version, document its provenance, and provide verification or lockfile information for users.

What this means

The local Naver thin-runner may continue operating as a background service after setup, which is expected for this workflow but should be visible to the user.

Why it was flagged

The setup command defaults to enabling auto-service behavior for the local runner, suggesting persistent background service configuration.

Skill content
AUTO_SERVICE="${AUTO_SERVICE:-both}" ... runner_cmd+=(--auto-service "$AUTO_SERVICE")
Recommendation

Document exactly what services are installed, how to stop or uninstall them, and consider making auto-service opt-in rather than the default.

What this means

The post content is sealed locally before submission, but job metadata and attestations are still shared with the configured ACP endpoint as part of publishing.

Why it was flagged

The publish flow sends runner attestation and sealed job payload data to an externally configured offering execute URL.

Skill content
runner_attestation: identity.runner_attestation, sealed_payload: sealed.sealed_payload ... -d "$execute_body" "$OFFERING_EXECUTE_URL"
Recommendation

Use only trusted offering execute URLs, document what metadata is transmitted, and avoid configuring sensitive endpoints casually.