Podcast Notes

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: May 29, 2026 at 8:18 PM UTC
• Version:
  2.0.1

Overview

This appears to be a local podcast-note logging utility that stores and exports plaintext user-entered content, with no evidence of exfiltration, credential use, destructive behavior, or hidden execution.

Install only if you want a persistent local podcast-notes logbook. Avoid entering secrets, credentials, private guest contact details, sponsor terms, or embargoed material unless you are comfortable with that content being stored in plaintext under ~/.local/share/podcast-notes and included in exports.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (6)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The script is marketed as a podcast content-generation assistant, but its implemented behavior is largely a persistent local datastore for arbitrary user inputs, with history, search, and export features. That mismatch matters because users may provide drafts, guest notes, sponsor terms, or other sensitive content expecting transient processing, while the tool silently retains and republishes it.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low

• Confidence: 86% confidence
• Finding: The export/search capabilities are generic data-management features that exceed what a narrow podcast assistant would typically need, increasing the chance of unintended collection and resurfacing of sensitive notes. While not inherently malicious, these broader capabilities enlarge the privacy and misuse surface beyond user expectations.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 92% confidence
• Finding: The markdown explicitly states that all user content is stored as plain-text logs and can be exported, but it provides no privacy warning, retention notice, or guidance about sensitive data handling. In this context, users may paste confidential show notes, guest contact details, embargoed content, or monetization plans that then remain unencrypted and accessible to other local processes or users depending on system configuration.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: User-provided content is appended to local log files immediately, without any upfront warning, consent, or indication that the data will persist under ~/.local/share/podcast-notes. This is dangerous because users may enter confidential episode plans, guest information, or business notes believing they are ephemeral, leaving sensitive plaintext artifacts on disk.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The export function consolidates all accumulated logs into json/csv/txt files without warning that historical user content may be bundled together into a new artifact. This increases exposure by creating easy-to-share or easy-to-misplace aggregate files containing potentially sensitive plaintext notes.

Ssd 3

Medium

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The tool records user inputs in plaintext and later re-displays them through status, recent, search, and export flows, making sensitive material easy to recover from the local filesystem or terminal output. In the context of a content assistant, users are likely to paste raw notes, guest contact details, sponsor copy, or unpublished plans, so silent retention and resurfacing materially increase privacy risk.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.