Satgate

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This SatGate CLI skill is purpose-aligned, but its installer can place and run a newly downloaded binary with elevated trust, so users should review it before installing.

Install only if you trust SatGate's GitHub releases and cloud service. Prefer a user-writable install directory, verify the release checksum or source before running scripts/install.sh, and use a least-privilege SatGate API key or token. Do not wrap untrusted agent commands or MCP clients with SatGate tokens.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The script prompts for an API key and writes it to ~/.satgate/config.json, but it does not clearly warn the user beforehand that the secret will be stored on disk in plaintext. This can lead to unintended credential persistence on shared systems, backed-up home directories, or developer machines where users assumed the value was only used transiently.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The installer runs the freshly downloaded binary immediately after placing it in the target directory, with no opt-in confirmation. Even though a checksum is checked when available, the binary and checksum file are both fetched from the same remote source, and verification is explicitly skipped in several cases, so this creates an unnecessary remote-code-execution step during installation.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal