Volcengine IaC

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Jun 3, 2026, 11:41 AM
• Version:
  1.0.0

Overview

This is a legitimate Terraform helper for Volcengine, but it can create or delete real cloud resources and should only be used with careful plan review.

Install or use this only if you intentionally want Terraform to manage Volcengine infrastructure. Review every Terraform plan before applying, do not use the reference-file -auto-approve commands as production guidance, protect Terraform state and .volcengine/iac-outputs.json as secrets, and use least-privilege or temporary Volcengine credentials.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (22)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The example instructs users to export long-lived cloud access credentials directly into shell environment variables without any accompanying warning about secret handling, shell history, shared terminal sessions, or safer alternatives. While common in setup docs, this can lead to accidental credential exposure through process listings, terminal logging, screenshots, CI logs, or reused shells, especially in infrastructure workflows where the credentials are highly privileged.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The document provides a verified command sequence that includes `terraform apply` and `terraform destroy` against real Volcengine resources, but it does not prominently warn users that these commands will create and delete cloud infrastructure and may incur charges or cause service disruption. In an IaC skill, this is especially risky because readers may treat the sequence as safe copy-paste guidance and execute destructive operations without confirming the target account, region, state, and resource scope.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 87% confidence
• Finding: The file includes a verified command sequence with `terraform apply` and `terraform destroy` against live Volcengine resources, but it does not explicitly warn that these commands will create billable cloud infrastructure and later delete it. In an agent skill context, users may copy commands verbatim, so omission of a safety warning increases the chance of unintended provisioning, service disruption, or data loss if adapted to existing environments.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: The document includes `terraform destroy -auto-approve -input=false` in a verified command sequence without any caution that it is destructive or should only be run in a disposable test environment. In an IaC skill, users often copy-paste command blocks verbatim, so presenting destruction commands as routine steps materially increases the risk of accidental teardown of real infrastructure.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The example instructs users to export `VOLCENGINE_ACCESS_KEY` and `VOLCENGINE_SECRET_KEY` directly in the shell without warning about secret handling, shell history exposure, shared terminals, or safer credential-loading approaches. In a cloud/IaC context this can lead to credential leakage and unauthorized access if users follow the example in insecure environments or paste real secrets into logged sessions.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The document includes a verified command sequence with `terraform apply` and `terraform destroy` that will create and then delete real cloud infrastructure, but it does not place an explicit safety warning immediately around those commands. In an agent skill context, users may copy-paste the sequence mechanically, increasing the risk of unintended resource creation, charges, or deletion of test infrastructure if adapted incautiously.

Missing User Warnings

Low

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The documented command sequence includes `terraform apply` followed by `terraform destroy`, but it does not explicitly warn readers that running it will provision and then delete real Volcengine resources. In an IaC skill, this omission can lead to unintended cloud actions, unexpected charges, or accidental execution in the wrong account or environment, especially when users copy-paste the verified sequence.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The document provides a verified command sequence that includes `terraform apply` and `terraform destroy` against real Volcengine resources using live credentials, but it does not clearly warn users that these commands will create and delete cloud infrastructure. In an agent skill context, this is more dangerous because examples may be copied verbatim or surfaced automatically, increasing the chance of unintended provisioning, billing impact, or destructive teardown in a real account.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: This documentation includes `terraform apply`, `terraform destroy`, and `terraform state rm` sequences that can create, mutate, detach from state, and delete real cloud infrastructure, but it does not present an explicit safety warning about cost, service interruption, or irrecoverable drift/state consequences. In an agent skill context, operational commands are especially risky because users or downstream automation may copy them directly, and `state rm` can leave unmanaged resources orphaned while `destroy` can remove live infrastructure.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: The document includes `terraform destroy -auto-approve -input=false` as part of a verified command sequence without any warning that it irreversibly deletes infrastructure. In an IaC skill, users may copy-paste the sequence verbatim, so presenting an automated destroy step without caution materially increases the risk of accidental data loss or service disruption, especially for shared storage resources like EFS.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: The document includes a `terraform destroy -input=false -auto-approve` command as part of a verified sequence without an explicit warning that it will delete live infrastructure. In an IaC skill, users may copy-paste the sequence verbatim, and the combination of destroy plus auto-approve increases the chance of accidental destructive action against real resources.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The document provides a copy-pastable command sequence that includes `terraform apply` and `terraform destroy` against real Volcengine credentials and region settings, but it does not explicitly warn that these commands will create and later delete live cloud infrastructure. In an IaC skill, users may treat a 'verified command sequence' as safe to run verbatim, which increases the chance of unintended charges, service disruption, or deletion of existing resources if adapted carelessly.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The document provides a verified command sequence that includes `terraform apply` and `terraform destroy` with live cloud credentials, but it does not include any caution about destructive impact, confirmation requirements, target isolation, or safe use in non-production environments. In an IaC skill, this increases the chance that a user or downstream agent runs deletion steps against real infrastructure or assumes the sequence is generally safe because it is presented as verified.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The document presents a full Terraform workflow including `apply` and `destroy` against real cloud resources, but it does not prominently warn that these commands will create billable infrastructure and later delete it. In an agent skill context, users may copy or automate the sequence directly, increasing the chance of unintended provisioning, cost, or destructive teardown in the wrong account, region, or workspace.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: The document includes `terraform destroy` and state-manipulation guidance without an explicit warning that these actions can permanently delete cloud resources and alter Terraform state in ways that affect recovery. In an IaC skill, readers may copy the verified command sequence directly, so the lack of a clear safety warning increases the risk of accidental destructive execution against real infrastructure.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 84% confidence
• Finding: The guide tells users to export access credentials in the shell without any warning about secure handling, shell history, process exposure, or use of least-privilege credentials. This can lead to accidental credential leakage in shared terminals, logs, screenshots, CI output, or persistent shell configuration.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The documented verification sequence includes `terraform apply` and `terraform destroy`, which create and delete real Volcengine resources using live credentials, but the section does not clearly warn the reader that these are destructive, billable cloud operations. In a reference document for an agent skill, this can lead users or downstream agents to run the commands as routine validation, causing unintended infrastructure changes, charges, or deletion of existing resources if variables are modified incorrectly.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 87% confidence
• Finding: The document instructs users to export long-lived cloud credentials and execute `terraform apply` and `terraform destroy` against real infrastructure without any nearby warning, guardrails, or requirement for explicit confirmation. In an agent skill context, operational runbooks can be copied or automated directly, so this increases the chance of credential exposure, unintended infrastructure deletion, or running destructive commands in the wrong account or region.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: The document includes `terraform apply -auto-approve` and `terraform destroy -auto-approve` in a verified command sequence without an adjacent safety warning or requirement for explicit user confirmation. In an IaC skill, this can normalize destructive execution and make it easier for an agent or user to run infrastructure-changing commands without reviewing the plan, increasing the risk of unintended resource creation or deletion.

Missing User Warnings

Low

• Confidence: 76% confidence
• Finding: The example instructs users to export `VOLCENGINE_ACCESS_KEY` and `VOLCENGINE_SECRET_KEY` but does not include any warning about handling secrets safely, shell history exposure, or avoiding hardcoding/logging credentials. While common in documentation, this still creates a real risk of accidental credential leakage in shared terminals, CI logs, screenshots, or copied transcripts.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The document includes `terraform destroy -auto-approve` in a verified command sequence without an explicit warning that it will delete live cloud resources and may incur downtime or permanent data loss if reused against non-test state. In an IaC skill, users often copy commands verbatim, so presenting destructive operations as routine verification steps materially increases the risk of accidental infrastructure deletion.

Missing User Warnings

Low

• Confidence: 87% confidence
• Finding: The example instructs users to export cloud access credentials as environment variables without warning that these values are secrets that can be exposed through shell history, process inspection, terminal logging, or copied transcripts. While this is a common Terraform workflow, omitting basic secret-handling guidance can lead to inadvertent credential leakage and subsequent unauthorized cloud access.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.