DualAgentDebate

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears purpose-aligned, but it reads and writes Open Brain memories and may send private thoughts/context to OpenAI or a local OpenClaw agent.

Before installing, confirm you are comfortable with this skill reading your Open Brain thoughts, sending relevant memory/context through OpenAI or OpenClaw, and saving the debate result back into Open Brain. Use least-privilege MCP credentials and avoid running it on highly sensitive memories unless you have reviewed the configured data path.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

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ASI06: Memory and Context Poisoning
Medium
What this means

Private thoughts or memory content may be included in prompts or embeddings and the generated result may become part of future Open Brain memory.

Why it was flagged

The skill intentionally reads persistent personal memory, uses it in model/embedding workflows, and writes the result back to persistent memory.

Skill content
Pull related prior thoughts from `public.thoughts` via MCP `execute_sql` ... Compute semantic similarity (OpenAI embeddings) between ChatGPT reply and thoughts ... Persist full outcome into `public.memories`
Recommendation

Use this only with Open Brain data you are comfortable sending through the selected model path, and consider reviewing or deleting the saved memory after sensitive debates.

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ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation
Low
What this means

If the configured MCP SQL tool has broad database privileges, the skill runs with that authority when reading thoughts and saving outcomes.

Why it was flagged

The script uses an MCP SQL execution tool to access Open Brain tables. This is aligned with the described workflow, but raw SQL-style tools are broader than a narrowly scoped read/write API.

Skill content
def sql_query(sql_tool: str, query: str) -> dict:
    return mcp_call(sql_tool, {"query": query})
Recommendation

Point the skill at an MCP endpoint or token with least-privilege access limited to the intended Open Brain tables.

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ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse
Low
What this means

Anyone with access to these tokens may be able to use the associated Open Brain or OpenAI permissions.

Why it was flagged

The skill supports bearer-token access to Open Brain MCP and optional OpenAI API access. These credentials are expected for the integration and no credential leakage is shown.

Skill content
export OPENBRAIN_MCP_TOKEN="..."
...
export OPENAI_API_KEY="..."
Recommendation

Use scoped tokens where possible, avoid sharing environment files, and rotate credentials if they may have been exposed.

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ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication
Low
What this means

The nested agent path may use the user's existing OpenClaw agent configuration and permissions rather than a narrowly scoped debate-only model call.

Why it was flagged

When no OpenAI API key is set, the script sends the constructed prompt, including Open Brain context and thoughts, to the user's main OpenClaw agent.

Skill content
cmd = ["openclaw", "agent", "--json", "--agent", "main", "--thinking", "off", "--message", prompt]
Recommendation

If you use the fallback path, ensure your main OpenClaw agent configuration is appropriate for receiving private memory context, or set an explicit OpenAI API key/model path instead.