Securely interact with Bitwarden/Vaultwarden vaults using rbw CLI. Use when retrieving credentials, managing vault items, or integrating secrets into scripts/systemd services. Handles authentication, field access, and non-interactive operation patterns.

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: May 28, 2026, 9:09 AM
• Version:
  1.0.0

Overview

This is an instruction-only helper for using rbw with Bitwarden/Vaultwarden; it is purpose-aligned but includes a risky optional non-interactive setup that stores the vault master password in plaintext.

Install only if you want an agent to help operate rbw against your Bitwarden/Vaultwarden vault. Prefer interactive unlocks or systemd LoadCredential over storing the master password in plaintext, and only allow secret retrieval or outbound credential use for explicit, trusted folders, items, and services.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 86% confidence
• Finding: The examples retrieve credentials from the vault and immediately use them in an outbound request, normalizing secret transmission to a remote service without emphasizing transport, endpoint trust, logging, or process-exposure risks. In a secrets-management skill this is contextually relevant, but it still encourages handling patterns that can leak credentials through command arguments, debug logs, proxies, or unintended destinations if copied blindly.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: The guide instructs users to store the Bitwarden master password in a plaintext systemd environment file and expose it as an environment variable to a pinentry wrapper. That creates a highly sensitive secret-at-rest and secret-in-process exposure path: the master password can be recovered from the file, inherited environment, misconfigured service metadata, backups, or debugging output, and compromise of it exposes the entire vault rather than a single credential.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.