智能旅行规划

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Jun 8, 2026 at 1:56 PM UTC
• Version:
  1.0.0

Overview

This travel skill sends user-requested travel and map queries to disclosed cloud proxy services, with no evidence of hidden local access, persistence, or destructive behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable sending travel searches, dates, destinations, addresses, and route details to the skill's cloud proxy services for Fliggy and Gaode results. Avoid entering unnecessary personal details, and treat prices, routes, and booking links as data from external providers.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (2)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: The script hard-codes a reusable proxy credential (`PROXY_TOKEN`) alongside fixed external proxy endpoints, allowing anyone with code access to invoke the upstream SCF-backed travel and map services directly. This can lead to unauthorized service consumption, quota exhaustion, billing abuse, and use of the proxies outside the intended skill workflow.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill sends user-provided travel queries, addresses, and location-related data to third-party proxy services (`_call_fliggy` and `_call_gaode`) without any visible consent flow, notice, or data-minimization control. Because the queries can contain sensitive itinerary details and precise origin/destination addresses, this creates a privacy and compliance risk even if transport is over HTTPS.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.