ecap Security Auditor

AdvisoryAudited by Static analysis on May 10, 2026.

Overview

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal, suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions

Findings (2)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

Anyone who can read the package may be able to act as that registry agent and submit or manipulate trust-registry data.

Why it was flagged

The documentation includes an apparent bearer credential in runnable POST examples instead of a placeholder.

Skill content
-H "Authorization: Bearer ecap_2c909be35dfa..."
Recommendation

Revoke and rotate the token, remove it from examples and repository history, and require users to register and store their own credentials securely.

What this means

A false registry report could cause the agent to block a legitimate package or mislead users about package safety.

Why it was flagged

The skill's automatic gate uses registry findings and trust scores, so unreviewed bogus findings can cascade into install warnings, blocks, or trust-score damage.

Skill content
Successfully submitted a fake critical finding ... API accepted it without any verification ... Findings are immediately active (`status: reported`).
Recommendation

Do not automatically block on unreviewed findings; require review/reputation controls, signed evidence, or explicit user confirmation before gate decisions affect installs.

What this means

The agent may contact external services and interrupt installs even when the user did not explicitly ask for this specific check.

Why it was flagged

The skill instructs broad automatic tool use and install blocking across package ecosystems, with limited per-action user control in the documented flow.

Skill content
Every time you install or use a package, run this check automatically ... `pip install <package>` / `npm install <package>` ... Score < 40 | 🔴 Block
Recommendation

Require user approval for automatic audits and any blocking decision, and document clear behavior for API failures, unknown packages, and disputed findings.

What this means

A manipulated verification endpoint could make tampered files appear trusted.

Why it was flagged

The artifact's own adversarial report says the integrity verifier can be redirected to a controlled API endpoint, weakening the provenance check.

Skill content
`verify.sh` accepts an arbitrary second argument as API URL ... bypassing integrity verification entirely.
Recommendation

Hardcode or allowlist trusted integrity endpoints, validate URLs, and prefer signed integrity metadata over unsigned remote responses.

Findings (2)

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

Location
API-RESPONSES.md:199
Finding
File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.
warn

suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions

Location
prompts/audit-prompt.md:62
Finding
Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.