Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected
ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.
Ultra Memory
v3.0.5ultra-memory 是多模型 AI 的超长会话记忆系统。 【必须触发-中文】用户说以下任意词:记住、别忘了、记录一下、不要忘记、上次我们做了什么、帮我回忆、继续上次的、从上次继续、记忆、帮我记、追踪进度 【必须触发-英文】用户说以下任意词:remember、don't forget、recall、what...
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MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
OpenClaw
Benign
medium confidencePurpose & Capability
Name/description match the delivered artifacts: SKILL.md, scripts, a local REST/MCP server, and tooling to init/log/recall/summarize/restore memories. Nothing requested (env vars, binaries, or credentials) is unexpected for a local memory system.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md and SYSTEM_PROMPT instruct the agent to initialize sessions, log every significant operation (tool calls, file reads/writes, shell commands, decisions, errors), and potentially auto-hook into conversation loops. This is consistent with a memory system but grants broad discretion to collect: file paths, commands, assistant/user message text, and structured details—any of which can include secrets. The skill includes warnings about not logging secrets and a configurable sensitive_patterns filter, but logging behavior is automatic by default and depends on proper configuration and redaction in the scripts.
Install Mechanism
No network install or remote downloads are required by the skill bundle provided (no install spec). All code is included in the skill. This lowers supply-chain risk compared to downloads from arbitrary URLs.
Credentials
The skill accesses/writes to a local directory (~/.ultra-memory by default) and reads/writes files there (sessions, semantic stores, user_profile, etc.), which is expected. It does not request external credentials. However, because it records file operations, commands, and message text, it can capture sensitive data unless configured to skip paths or redact patterns. Advanced options discuss network/shared storage (S3, team NAS) — those are optional but increase blast radius if enabled.
Persistence & Privilege
always:false and no special platform-wide override are set. The skill can be integrated as a local MCP/REST service and hook into conversation loops (auto-hooking is optional). The server can be started to listen on networks (e.g., host 0.0.0.0) if misconfigured — the docs warn about that. No evidence of the skill modifying other skills' configs or requesting permanent elevated privileges by default.
Assessment
This skill appears to do what it says: keep persistent, searchable records of agent activity. Before you install or enable it widely, consider the following:
- Review the scripts (especially scripts/log_op.py, scripts/recall.py, scripts/init.py, and platform/server.py) to confirm how they redact or filter sensitive content. The SKILL.md mentions redaction, but defaults/configuration determine whether secrets are actually removed.
- Run it in an isolated/sandbox environment first to observe what it logs (ops.jsonl, knowledge_base.jsonl, user_profile.json). Check for accidental capture of API keys, tokens, file contents, or other secrets.
- Set ULTRA_MEMORY_HOME to a location you control and set file permissions (chmod 700) so only you can read the memory store. Regularly inspect/rotate or delete stored sessions if needed.
- Disable or avoid enabling networked/shared storage options (S3, team NAS) unless you understand the consequences and add proper access controls and encryption.
- If you use automatic hooks (clawbot_hook.yaml, post_tool_call), be aware they will log without additional prompts — consider narrowing the hooks, skipping certain op_types, or adding skip_paths for sensitive directories (e.g., ~/.ssh, /etc)
- Add/verify sensitive_patterns in config.json to redact patterns used by your org (API keys, internal tokens, etc.). Don't rely solely on generic patterns.
- Do not run the REST server bound to 0.0.0.0 or otherwise expose it publicly without network-level authentication/firewalls.
If you want a stronger safety posture before adoption: audit the redaction implementation in the code, disable auto-logging hooks, and limit the skill to local-only operation with strict directory permissions. If you want, I can scan specific scripts (e.g., log_op.py, extract_entities.py) for their redaction logic and exact file I/O behavior — that would raise confidence in this assessment.scripts/mcp-server.js:31
Shell command execution detected (child_process).
Patterns worth reviewing
These patterns may indicate risky behavior. Check the VirusTotal and OpenClaw results above for context-aware analysis before installing.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
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License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
