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Safe Exec 0.3.2
v1.0.0Safe command execution for OpenClaw Agents with automatic danger pattern detection, risk assessment, user approval workflow, and audit logging. Use when agents need to execute shell commands that may be dangerous (rm -rf, dd, fork bombs, system directory modifications) or require human oversight. Provides multi-level risk assessment (CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW), in-session notifications, pending request management, and non-interactive environment support for agent automation.
⭐ 4· 2.3k·20 current·22 all-time
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
OpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidencePurpose & Capability
The name/description (SafeExec) align with the shipped scripts and docs: there are multiple shell scripts for interception, approval, listing pending requests, and audit logging. However the SKILL.md claims it will “automatically monitor all shell commands” system-wide as a Skill (not a plugin). That capability normally requires either modifying shell startup files, wrapping executables, or being integrated in the host runtime — none of which are declared explicitly. The repository includes wrapper scripts and link/installation guidance (symlinks, PATH changes, OpenClaw config edits), so behavior is plausible, but the SKILL.md overstates 'automatic' system-wide interception without detailing the required host changes.
Instruction Scope
Runtime instructions tell the agent/user to install via ClawdHub or git clone and then enable SafeExec so it will 'monitor all shell commands' and intercept dangerous ones. The docs and scripts reference persistent file locations (~/.openclaw/safe-exec/, ~/.openclaw/safe-exec-audit.log, pending/), cron jobs (monitoring), and monitoring of OpenClaw sessions/GitHub issues. The instruction set therefore encourages creating long-lived files, cron/monitoring tasks, and potentially reading OpenClaw session data. The SKILL.md does not require or declare any credentials for external notification channels (Feishu/GitHub) yet the monitoring code and docs describe sending notifications and calling APIs — that scope creep (reading session messages and posting external notifications) is not clearly scoped or constrained in the skill metadata.
Install Mechanism
Registry shows no install spec (instruction-only), which is lower risk. The package itself contains many script files (safe-exec.sh and helpers) and tooling; installation guidance in SKILL.md recommends git clone from GitHub or using ClawdHub. There are no opaque remote downloads or binary installers in the metadata. That said, the SKILL.md suggests an in-chat 'Help me install...' action that will cause the agent/system to fetch & install the skill — you should confirm what exact URL and code will be fetched by that mechanism (the docs reference a GitHub repo but the registry 'Source' is 'unknown' and homepage is empty).
Credentials
The skill metadata declares no required environment variables or credentials, but the documentation lists configuration variables (SAFE_EXEC_DISABLE, OPENCLAW_AGENT_CALL, SAFE_EXEC_AUTO_CONFIRM, SAFE_EXEC_FEISHU_GROUP, SAFE_EXEC_AUDIT_LOG) and monitoring features that post to Feishu/GitHub and read OpenClaw session data. The skill may rely on existing OpenClaw CLI/credentials on the host to access session history or send notifications, which is not documented in the registry metadata. In short: no explicit credential requests is plausible, but the code/docs indicate access to external services and agent session content — that access is not declared and thus disproportionate to what the metadata advertises.
Persistence & Privilege
The skill does not request always: true and does not declare elevated privileges. However it writes persistent data under ~/.openclaw/, creates cron/monitoring scripts, and provides non-interactive (agent) bypass behavior (OPENCLAW_AGENT_CALL) that automatically skips confirmations for agent calls. Those are significant operational behaviors: the skill establishes ongoing local presence and can change runtime behavior for automated agent runs. This persistence is expected for a protection tool, but it increases blast radius if the skill were malicious or misconfigured.
What to consider before installing
Things to check before installing:
- Source authenticity: SKILL.md and READMEs reference a GitHub repo (OTTTTTO/safe-exec) but the registry shows 'Source: unknown' and no homepage. Verify the canonical repository URL and the publisher identity before installing.
- Read the scripts (especially scripts/safe-exec.sh and scripts/safe-exec-ai-wrapper.sh): the package is script-based — inspect what it writes to ~/.openclaw/, what commands it executes, and whether it modifies shell startup files or PATH/symlinks.
- Understand how 'automatic monitoring' is implemented: the skill claims to intercept all shell commands. Confirm whether it requires modifying shell rc files, replacing executables, adding wrappers to PATH, or editing OpenClaw config. Any of those actions change system behavior and should be allowed only with explicit user consent.
- Non-interactive/agent behavior: changelog and docs say agent (non-interactive) calls can bypass human confirmation (OPENCLAW_AGENT_CALL). If you expect agents to be constrained, this default bypass undermines protection — review and test the non-interactive logic.
- External integrations and credentials: unified-monitor and notification docs mention Feishu and GitHub and reading OpenClaw session contents. Determine if the code will use existing OpenClaw CLI credentials or ask for tokens. If the skill can read agent session content, that may expose sensitive conversations — only install if you trust the skill and its maintainer.
- Test in a sandbox first: try installing in an isolated environment or container, exercise interception/approval flows, and verify audit logs and cleanup behavior.
- Audit log permissions: audit logs store executed commands; ensure log files have appropriate file permissions and rotation to avoid leaking sensitive command contents.
- Prefer manual install: rather than the one-click in-chat install, consider cloning the repository yourself, reviewing the code, and installing with explicit, audited steps.
If you cannot confirm the publisher identity or cannot review the scripts, treat this skill as higher risk and avoid enabling it on production or sensitive machines.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
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License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.