Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected

ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.

PayTrigo (OpenClawBot, Base/USDC)

v1.0.0

Use when an OpenClawBot needs to create or verify PayTrigo payments on Base/USDC without webhooks.

2· 1.5k·1 current·1 all-time
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
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Suspicious
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OpenClawOpenClaw
Suspicious
high confidence
Purpose & Capability
The code (scripts/*.mjs) implements invoice creation, intent retrieval, tx submission and polling against api.paytrigo.net, which matches the skill description (PayTrigo on Base/USDC). However, instead of requiring the operator to supply a platform API key or declare it as a credential, the scripts ship with hardcoded 'sk_live_...' API keys, which is unusual and insecure for a reusable skill — embedding keys is not necessary for the stated purpose and reduces control for the user.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md instructs the agent/user to create/read local wallet files, passphrase files, and optionally provide a raw private key via CLI. These actions are within the payment flow's scope, but accepting private keys on the command line (or storing unprotected files) and using an embedded platform key expands the risk surface; the instructions do not require or instruct any unrelated system access.
Install Mechanism
There is no external download/install spec beyond npm install and a single dependency (ethers). No remote archives or unknown URL downloads are used; installation risk is limited to typical npm dependency installation.
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Credentials
The package declares no required env vars and SKILL.md claims a platform key is embedded for no-setup usage. The code contains multiple hardcoded platform keys (files: scripts/moltbot-bot-flow.mjs, scripts/moltbot-human-flow.mjs, scripts/paytrigo.mjs). Embedding live-looking API keys in distributed code is disproportionate and risky: keys can be abused, are not user-controlled, and there is no declaration of who owns them. The scripts also encourage passing private keys via CLI (exposes them to process lists) or storing passphrases/files locally — both are legitimate for operation but should be handled more securely and explicitly documented as risky.
Persistence & Privilege
always:false and no install-time persistence or modification of other skills is requested. The skill does not claim or implement system-wide configuration changes beyond writing its own local wallet/recipient files under a .openclawbot directory.
Scan Findings in Context
[HARD_CODED_API_KEY_moltbot-bot-flow] unexpected: scripts/moltbot-bot-flow.mjs contains a hardcoded API_KEY value 'sk_live_EQRe18nZCj...'. Supplying a platform key inside distributed code is not expected as a best practice even though the skill claims to use a platform key.
[HARD_CODED_API_KEY_moltbot-human-flow] unexpected: scripts/moltbot-human-flow.mjs contains a hardcoded API_KEY 'sk_live_EQRe18nZCj...'. Same concern as above.
[HARD_CODED_API_KEY_paytrigo] unexpected: scripts/paytrigo.mjs contains a DEFAULT_API_KEY 'sk_live_M4vDBePQLu8Uenl-...'. Multiple embedded keys across files increase the chance the distributed keys are live and may be abused.
What to consider before installing
This skill mostly does what it says (creates invoices, returns intents, polls status), but exercise caution before installing or running it: - Do not rely on the embedded API keys. Treat the hardcoded 'sk_live_...' values as secrets that could be abused by whoever controls them. Prefer to replace them with your own platform key (provided securely) or modify the code to read a key from a protected environment variable. - Verify the source. The skill has no homepage and an unknown source; confirm you trust the author before using keys embedded in their code. - Avoid passing raw private keys on the command line (use encrypted wallet files and passphrases). Passing a private key via --pk can expose it in process listings; use the encrypted wallet store and supply passphrases via a file with strict permissions. - Review and, if desired, remove or rotate any embedded keys before running in production. Test with minimal amounts and in an isolated environment first. - If you need this functionality but don't want to trust embedded credentials, fork the code, remove the hardcoded keys, and inject your API key via env vars or a secure secrets mechanism. If you want, I can help produce a safe checklist or provide a patched version of the scripts that reads API keys from environment variables and warns if a hardcoded key is present.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

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