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Nm Conjure Delegation Core
v1.0.0Delegate tasks to external LLM services (Gemini, Qwen) with quota, logging,
⭐ 0· 0·0 current·0 all-time
by@athola
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
Capability signals
These labels describe what authority the skill may exercise. They are separate from suspicious or malicious moderation verdicts.
OpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidencePurpose & Capability
The name/description (delegate tasks to Gemini/Qwen with quota and logging) aligns with the SKILL.md content: task assessment, cost estimation, handoff templates, and usage logging. Declared required config paths (leyline: quota-management, usage-logging, service-registry, error-patterns, authentication-patterns) are appropriate for a delegation/framework skill. Minor namespace inconsistency: docs often reference 'leyline:...' while registry lists 'night-market.leyline:...'; this is likely a naming/packaging mismatch but not a functional red flag by itself.
Instruction Scope
The SKILL.md explicitly instructs agents to form delegation plans, run delegations (e.g., external model calls), capture full outputs to files, and log usage — all expected. However the docs also instruct setting environment variables (CLAUDE_CODE_ACCOUNT_UUID, CLAUDE_CODE_USER_EMAIL, CLAUDE_CODE_ORGANIZATION_UUID) and running local commands (e.g., 'claude mcp add') even though those env vars/commands are not declared in the registry. The skill asks agents to transmit potentially large chunks of context to external LLMs; while the text warns about sensitive data, the runtime instructions grant broad discretion to send context and to save/send outputs, which could lead to unintended data exposure if used carelessly.
Install Mechanism
Instruction-only skill with no install spec or code files — lowest install risk. It relies on existing environment tooling (Claude Code, leyline modules) but doesn't download or write new code itself.
Credentials
Registry lists no required environment variables, yet SKILL.md references env vars (CLAUDE_CODE_*) for telemetry and suggests storing OAuth client IDs/secrets via 'claude mcp add'. The skill also depends on leyline configuration entries; these configs likely grant the skill access to quota/usage/auth information. The mismatch between declared env requirements (none) and docs that instruct use of env vars and client secrets is an inconsistency that could lead to unexpected credential handling or telemetry leakage if users follow the docs without realizing the skill did not declare those requirements.
Persistence & Privilege
always is false and the skill is user-invocable; it does not request permanent/autonomous elevation. It does instruct logging and saving outputs (audit trail), which is reasonable for a delegation framework but should be reviewed for where logs are stored and who can access them.
What to consider before installing
This skill is a delegation framework and generally does what it says: route tasks to external LLMs, estimate costs, and log usage. Before installing or using it:
- Confirm where leyline configs (quota-management, usage-logging, service-registry, error-patterns, authentication-patterns) live and who controls them; these configs govern quotas, telemetry, and auth flow.
- The SKILL.md references environment variables (CLAUDE_CODE_ACCOUNT_UUID, CLAUDE_CODE_USER_EMAIL, CLAUDE_CODE_ORGANIZATION_UUID) and advises adding OAuth client IDs/secrets via 'claude mcp add'. Those env vars and secrets are not declared in the registry — treat that as a documentation/manifest mismatch. Do not expose sensitive account identifiers/secrets to this skill until you understand how and where telemetry and logs are stored/transmitted.
- The skill’s runtime workflow explicitly saves delegation inputs/outputs and sends context to external LLMs. Never delegate sensitive data (secrets, passwords, private keys, or PII) unless you control the external service and have audited its policies.
- Verify the destination endpoints (Gemini/Qwen connectors, MCP servers) and ensure you trust them. If possible, test in an isolated environment with non-sensitive sample data first.
- If you need stronger assurance, ask the author for clarification about: (1) the exact leyline services used and their data flows, (2) whether/where telemetry and logs are transmitted, and (3) a manifest of env vars the skill expects at runtime. If those answers are not satisfactory, keep this skill flagged/disabled for production workloads.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
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License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Runtime requirements
🦞 Clawdis
Confignight-market.leyline:quota-management, night-market.leyline:usage-logging, night-market.leyline:service-registry, night-market.leyline:error-patterns, night-market.leyline:authentication-patterns