Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected

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Agent Firewall

v1.0.0

Real-time input/output filtering for agent communications. Block prompt injection, data exfiltration, and unauthorized commands before they reach the model.

0· 56·0 current·0 all-time
byAdnane Arharbi@arhadnane
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
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Purpose & Capability
Name, description, and code align with an input/output firewall: the code implements injection detection, secret/PII redaction, path scrubbing, etc. It requests no unrelated credentials or binaries. HOWEVER the SKILL.md presents features (reading and applying .security/firewall-rules.yaml, append-only rule lifecycle, enforcement that the firewall cannot be disabled) that the code does not actually implement: loadRules explicitly warns it does not parse YAML and always falls back to built-in defaults. That mismatch should be explained.
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Instruction Scope
SKILL.md and index.js operate only on provided data and local files; they do not call external endpoints. But the skill promises logging of 'full context' and in code execute() returns originalData alongside processedData — meaning unredacted inputs/outputs may be written to disk and included in responses. The docs' claims about making the rules read-only and preventing agent disablement are not enforced in code. These gaps increase risk of accidental sensitive-data persistence or misconfiguration.
Install Mechanism
No install spec and no external downloads — lowest-risk install. The skill is delivery-as-code (index.js + SKILL.md) and only uses standard fs/path modules.
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Credentials
The skill requests no credentials or env vars (appropriate), but it writes logs containing actions and context under .security/firewall-logs and returns originalData in responses. That creates a local storage surface for potentially sensitive secrets/PII (which the skill is supposed to detect). There is no encryption, rotation, retention policy, or config/comments explaining access controls for those logs.
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Persistence & Privilege
always:false and no autonomous-privilege flags are fine. However the skill creates and writes to .security/firewall-logs and will read a rules file path under process.cwd(). Those filesystem writes are normal for a firewall but may conflict with expectations in multi-tenant or restricted environments. The SKILL.md's statements about 'firewall cannot be disabled by agent instructions' and 'rules file read-only from agent perspective' are policy claims not enforced by the code — the skill cannot on its own prevent other processes/skills or users from modifying those files.
What to consider before installing
This skill appears to implement the advertised filtering features, but there are important mismatches and risks to verify before installing: - Confirm rule handling: SKILL.md says it reads .security/firewall-rules.yaml and enforces append-only lifecycle, but index.js currently does not parse external YAML and always uses built-in defaults. Ask the author whether YAML parsing and rule lifecycle enforcement are intentionally omitted or planned. - Logging and data retention: the skill logs actions and context to .security/firewall-logs and returns originalData in responses. Determine what exactly is logged, whether logs are encrypted, who can read them, and how long they're retained. In high-sensitivity environments, store logs securely or disable logging of full payloads. - File locations & permissions: the skill reads/writes under process.cwd() (.security/*). Decide whether that path is acceptable and ensure filesystem permissions prevent unauthorized reads/writes. The skill itself cannot enforce 'read-only' rules — use OS-level permissions or an external policy engine. - Test in a sandbox: run the skill in an isolated environment with representative inputs to confirm redaction behavior (including edge cases) and to verify no external exfiltration occurs. - Request hardening details from the author: YAML parsing implementation, rate-limiter/global state design, how the skill avoids accidental exposure (e.g., returning originalData), and whether there are configuration options for log encryption/retention. If the author can provide a version that actually parses and validates external rules, avoids returning originalData (or makes that configurable), and documents log access/retention/encryption, the concerns would be materially reduced.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

Runtime requirements

🧱 Clawdis

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