Cloud Phone Agent

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: May 28, 2026, 10:48 AM
• Version:
  0.0.2

Overview

This skill is a disclosed cloud-phone automation helper, but it depends on a powerful external CLI and API key that users should treat carefully.

Install only if you trust the mcporter package and your configured cpc-mcp-server. Use a least-privilege CLOUDPHONE_API_KEY, prefer test accounts and non-production cloud phones, review the exact app action before dispatching tasks, and avoid mcporter full-URL or --stdio modes unless you intentionally want those broader capabilities.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (2)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The README explicitly documents arbitrary remote URL invocation and arbitrary local stdio command execution, which are much broader than the skill's stated purpose of calling a specific cloud Android agent. In the context of an agent skill, these capabilities can enable SSRF-like outbound access, data exfiltration, or execution of unintended local programs if the wrapper does not strictly constrain inputs.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The examples normalize direct HTTP access and local stdio execution without any warning about network egress or command execution. In an agent-skill context, that omission increases the chance that operators expose dangerous capabilities without realizing they permit outbound requests and arbitrary local process launch.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.