Solana Trading Api
WarnAudited by ClawScan on May 10, 2026.
Overview
This is a coherent Solana trading API skill, but it can authorize wallet-backed crypto trades and persistent orders without visible per-trade safeguards, so users should review it carefully before use.
Only use this skill with wallets and amounts you are willing to risk. Confirm every token address, amount, slippage setting, and order before signing. Prefer a hardware wallet or constrained signer, avoid giving an agent raw private-key access, and check/cancel active WebSocket orders after use.
Findings (4)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
If an agent has signing access, a mistaken or overbroad instruction could cause unwanted token purchases, sales, slippage exposure, or other financial loss.
The skill instructs an agent/client through building, signing, and submitting Solana swap transactions, which is a high-impact financial action. The provided artifact does not show explicit confirmation, spending-limit, or transaction-review safeguards.
Instant buy or sell of a token | `POST /swap` → sign → `POST /protect`; Returns an **unsigned** transaction (base58). Client must sign it, then submit via `POST /protect`.
Require explicit user approval for every transaction and order, including token address, direction, amount, slippage, destination endpoint, and expected outcome. Prefer wallet UI or hardware-wallet signing where the user can inspect each request.
Granting an agent or client access to wallet signing can let it authenticate as the wallet owner and perform trading actions under that wallet identity.
Wallet private-key signing is proof-of-control for the account and enables authenticated order placement/cancellation. This is sensitive authority even though the private key is not shown as being transmitted.
the client must **sign the nonce** with the wallet’s private key (Ed25519) and send `register` with `wallet_address` and the base58 signature
Do not expose raw private keys to the agent. Use a constrained signer or hardware wallet, verify challenge domains and transaction contents before signing, and treat wallet-signing access as a high-risk credential.
Orders may remain active and fill later, even after the user thinks the immediate task is finished, unless they are explicitly canceled or expire.
The skill describes long-lived WebSocket operation and server-side persistent orders. That is purpose-aligned for limit/trailing orders, but the provided artifact does not show clear default expirations, automatic stop conditions, or bounded lifecycle controls.
Keep the WS connection alive for the lifetime of any active limit/trailing orders... On disconnect, reconnect and re-register... active orders persist server-side.
Set explicit expirations and maximum amounts for every order, list active orders after use, cancel unwanted orders, and avoid leaving long-running trading sessions unattended.
Users have less registry-level information for independently verifying the publisher and service before trusting it with wallet-related trading actions.
The registry metadata lacks source and homepage provenance, while the skill directs users to a third-party financial trading API. There is no local code install, so this is a provenance note rather than evidence of malicious behavior.
Source: unknown; Homepage: none
Verify the TradeRouter service, domain, publisher, and wallet-signing flow independently before using it with valuable wallets.
