Soul

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

Soul is openly designed as an autonomous background memory agent, but it also profiles conversations, messages users proactively, and can be configured to run arbitrary commands without confirmation.

Review this carefully before installing. It is not clearly malicious, but it is intentionally always-on and autonomous. Keep autonomousActions off unless sandboxed, explicitly configure message channels and targets, monitor or clear Soul's stored memory, and avoid using it in sensitive workspaces unless you are comfortable with persistent profiling and background LLM/search activity.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal engine telemetry is currently stale for this artifact.

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Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

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ASI05: Unexpected Code Execution
High
What this means

If enabled, Soul could make local code or environment changes automatically, including commands that affect files, credentials, services, or other projects.

Why it was flagged

The optional autonomousActions mode grants broad local mutation and shell execution authority without a documented command allowlist, sandbox, or rollback boundary.

Skill content
When `true`: Soul can additionally fix bugs, edit its own source code, and run any shell command.
Recommendation

Keep autonomousActions disabled unless you run Soul in a sandboxed workspace and are comfortable with autonomous command execution.

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ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation
High
What this means

High-impact actions may proceed without a human approval checkpoint once the relevant mode is enabled.

Why it was flagged

The skill intentionally suppresses confirmation-seeking for autonomous sub-agent tasks, which is risky when paired with write access or command execution.

Skill content
Tell autonomous agent tasks to not ask for confirmation... observe-and-improve and run-agent-task prompts now include an explicit instruction that no one will reply
Recommendation

Require explicit user approval for write, edit, execute, or agent-delegation actions, or limit these actions to a narrow allowlist.

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ASI10: Rogue Agents
Medium
What this means

Soul can continue thinking, learning, and sending messages after installation even when the user is not actively invoking it.

Why it was flagged

The skill is designed to keep operating outside direct user prompts and to retain state across restarts.

Skill content
Soul works silently in the background... Thinking | Continuously, in the background ... Memory | Persistent across restarts
Recommendation

Install only if you want an always-on assistant; use the enabled and proactiveMessaging settings to stop background activity when not desired.

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ASI06: Memory and Context Poisoning
Medium
What this means

Sensitive conversation details or incorrect learned preferences could be reused in later tasks and influence future agent behavior.

Why it was flagged

The skill persists user-derived memory and injects it into future prompt construction, creating long-lived privacy and prompt-influence risks.

Skill content
Soul remembers your conversations, preferences, and knowledge... User profile built from facts, preferences, and conversation history... `before_prompt_build` | Injects soul context
Recommendation

Review where Soul stores memory, periodically clear or audit it, and avoid using it with highly sensitive conversations unless retention controls are acceptable.

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ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse
Low
What this means

The plugin can use local OpenClaw authorization to send messages and invoke the message tool; this appears purpose-aligned but is privileged.

Why it was flagged

The plugin uses OpenClaw gateway or hooks tokens to invoke local gateway endpoints for proactive messaging.

Skill content
const authToken = resolveGatewayAuthToken(opts.openclawConfig); ... Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`
Recommendation

Use a scoped gateway/hooks token if available and verify that only intended tools and channels are enabled.

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ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication
Low
What this means

If channel or target detection is not what the user expects, proactive messages could go to the wrong user or group.

Why it was flagged

The skill can auto-select a messaging channel and recipient for proactive outbound communication.

Skill content
`proactiveChannel` ... auto-detects your first configured messaging channel ... `proactiveTarget` ... auto-learned from first message ... different user/group
Recommendation

Set proactiveChannel and proactiveTarget explicitly, especially in multi-channel or group-chat environments.