Mirror Palace

Security checks across static analysis, malware telemetry, and agentic risk

Overview

The skill description is nearly empty, but the bundle contains a broad personal agent workspace with persistent memory, private profile data, nested skills, and scheduled-agent instructions.

Treat this as a published personal workspace backup, not a clean scoped skill. Do not install it unless you intentionally want the Taylor/Chloe memory and operating rules in your agent context. A safe version should strip personal files, remove root AGENTS.md behavior, remove unrelated nested skills/scripts, and clearly document any memory, scheduler, cloud, or account integrations.

Static analysis

No static analysis findings were reported for this release.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal engine telemetry is currently stale for this artifact.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

#
ASI01: Agent Goal Hijack
High
What this means

The agent could adopt the bundled Chloe/Taylor operating context instead of staying focused on the user’s requested task.

Why it was flagged

These instructions make bundled or local files authoritative over every session and even tell the agent to follow and delete a BOOTSTRAP.md file. That is far broader than the top-level Mirror Palace skill description.

Skill content
## First Run
- If `BOOTSTRAP.md` exists: read it, follow it, then delete it.

## Every Session (must-do)
1. Read `SOUL.md` ... 3. Read `USER.md` ... 5. **If MAIN SESSION:** also read `MEMORY.md`
Recommendation

Remove global AGENTS-style rules from the skill bundle or scope them to explicit user invocation with clear disclosure and opt-in.

#
ASI06: Memory and Context Poisoning
High
What this means

A user may unknowingly import another person’s private memory/persona into their agent, causing wrong assumptions or disclosure of sensitive details.

Why it was flagged

The bundle contains personal profile and health information, and other bundled instructions require reading USER.md and memory files every session. This can contaminate the installing user’s agent context and exposes private personal data.

Skill content
- **Name:** Taylor ... - **Location:** Austin, TX ... ## Health Context
- Narcolepsy — this is physiological, not a character trait.
Recommendation

Do not publish personal memory/profile files inside a public skill. Replace them with templates or require the installing user to create their own local files.

#
ASI10: Rogue Agents
Medium
What this means

If followed, the skill could encourage recurring autonomous activity and messaging outside a one-time user request.

Why it was flagged

The artifact describes scheduled subagents, recurring report generation, aggregation, and outbound Telegram messaging, but the top-level skill metadata does not disclose any persistent scheduler or messaging behavior.

Skill content
Six agents report to Chloe ... Reports ... Marja → `shared/tracker-report.md` (11,14,17,20,23 CT) ... **Taylor receives ONE aggregated message per morning via Telegram.**
Recommendation

Keep scheduled-agent and messaging workflows out of this skill unless they are clearly documented, optional, and require explicit setup and approval.

#
ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Medium
What this means

A user may think they are installing an instruction-only skill while receiving extra runnable components and nested skill material.

Why it was flagged

A nested runnable package with an external optional dependency is included even though the evaluated skill declares no install spec or required dependencies. This creates an unclear supply-chain boundary.

Skill content
"optionalDependencies": {
  "mem0ai": "^1.0.0"
}, ... "bin": {
  "elite-memory": "./bin/elite-memory.js"
}
Recommendation

Remove unrelated nested packages/skills from the bundle or declare them explicitly with pinned dependencies and a clear reason they are needed.

#
ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse
Low
What this means

If a user grants these integrations later, the agent could affect accounts or services outside the apparent Mirror Palace scope.

Why it was flagged

The workspace model anticipates access to multiple third-party services, while the registry metadata declares no credentials. The artifacts do not show credential capture or use, but the intended authority is broader than disclosed.

Skill content
- **Integrations:** Canvas LMS, Slack, Notion, Apple Calendar, GitHub, Home Assistant.
Recommendation

Only grant account access after the skill clearly documents which services are used, why they are needed, and what actions are allowed.