Sigui Security

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This plugin is purpose-aligned, but it forwards detailed transaction and session context to a Sigui backend and can block wallet actions, so users should review its data-sharing scope before installing.

Install only if you trust the configured Sigui backend and are comfortable sending wallet destinations, amounts, raw transaction parameters, and session identifiers to it. Prefer a self-hosted or vetted HTTPS endpoint, avoid placing secrets in tool parameters, and verify watchedTools is explicitly scoped before using this with agents that can move funds.

Publisher note

This plugin hooks before_tool_call and sends preflight evaluation requests to a Sigui backend over HTTP using configured API endpoints /evaluate and optional /escalate. It does not submit blockchain transactions itself; it blocks or requires approval for risky wallet and transaction tool calls.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: The README explicitly documents sending detailed transaction context, including tool metadata, session identifiers, and raw parameters, to an external backend, but it does not clearly warn operators about the sensitivity of this data or advise on minimization. In a blockchain agent setting, these fields can expose wallet destinations, transaction intent, internal session correlation data, and potentially secrets or sensitive operational context if raw parameters are forwarded verbatim.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: This plugin sends detailed tool-call context to an external service at `config.apiUrl`, including `run_id`, `session_id`, `session_key`, and raw tool parameters, without any visible consent, minimization, or disclosure mechanism in this file. In an agent security plugin, those fields can contain sensitive operational or user data, so exfiltration to a configurable remote endpoint creates a real confidentiality risk even if the purpose is security evaluation.

VirusTotal

61/61 vendors flagged this plugin as clean.

View on VirusTotal