Boss Agent

Security checks across static analysis, malware telemetry, and agentic risk

Overview

This coordination skill is transparent about its purpose, but it asks for broad access to other agents’ histories, memory, status, and task channels without clear data-boundary or approval rules.

Install only if you intend this Boss Agent to see other agents’ conversations and memory and to send them work. Before using it, define which agents it may access, require approval for delegated operational tasks, and avoid letting it read or summarize unrelated sensitive history.

Static analysis

No static analysis findings were reported for this release.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

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ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse
Medium
What this means

The Boss Agent could see sensitive information from other agents and direct those agents to act using their own privileges.

Why it was flagged

The skill grants itself broad authority over other agents’ histories, task channels, and status, but the artifacts do not specify permission checks, consent boundaries, or task-scoped limits.

Skill content
- ✅ 读取 Ass Agent 的会话历史
- ✅ 读取 Ops Agent 的会话历史
- ✅ 向 Ass Agent 发送任务
- ✅ 向 Ops Agent 发送任务
- ✅ 查询所有 Agent 的状态
Recommendation

Require explicit user approval for cross-agent reads and delegated tasks, limit access to task-relevant sessions, and document which agents and permissions are allowed.

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ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication
Medium
What this means

A mistaken or overbroad instruction could be passed to another agent and acted on outside the user’s immediate view.

Why it was flagged

The skill uses direct session keys to send tasks to another agent, including the Ops Agent, without describing identity verification, message provenance, authorization, or data-boundary controls.

Skill content
sessions_send --session-key agent:ops:main --message "请执行运维任务:..."
Recommendation

Add clear inter-agent authentication, provenance labels, task confirmation steps, and limits on what can be sent to each agent.

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ASI06: Memory and Context Poisoning
Medium
What this means

Private or misleading content from another agent’s memory could influence the Boss Agent’s decisions or be summarized back to the user.

Why it was flagged

The skill explicitly allows reading other agents’ session history and memory, but does not instruct the agent to treat that retrieved content as untrusted, stale, or potentially sensitive.

Skill content
- **跨 Agent 查询** - 可以访问其他 Agent 的会话历史、记忆、状态
Recommendation

Treat other agents’ history and memory as untrusted context, minimize what is retrieved, redact secrets, and disclose the source of any summarized content.

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ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation
Low
What this means

The agent may attempt to list sessions or check local agent services as part of normal operation.

Why it was flagged

The command examples are purpose-aligned for coordination and status checking, but they expose operational tool usage that users should understand before enabling the skill.

Skill content
sessions_list --agent ass
sessions_list --agent ops
systemctl --user status openclaw-gateway-ops.service
Recommendation

Keep these actions user-visible and limit them to read-only checks unless the user explicitly approves a higher-impact operation.