add-agent

SuspiciousAudited by ClawScan on May 10, 2026.

Overview

The skill appears to create the requested agent, but it also gives the new agent broad access by copying the main agent’s auth profiles and making all sessions visible.

Review this skill carefully before using it. It is not showing clear malicious behavior, but it can significantly expand access: the new Telegram agent may receive copied credentials from the main agent and visibility into all sessions. Prefer creating a new agent with minimal credentials, limited session visibility, and explicit approval for each copied auth profile.

Findings (5)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

The new Telegram-linked agent may inherit the main agent’s account/API access and could act with credentials the user did not intend to delegate.

Why it was flagged

The workflow copies the main agent's entire auth profile store to the new agent, with no scoping to selected credentials or separate approval step.

Skill content
cp ${MAIN_AGENT_DIR}/auth-profiles.json \
   ${NEW_AGENT_DIR}/auth-profiles.json
Recommendation

Do not copy all auth profiles by default. Require explicit confirmation, copy only named profiles the user selects, and prefer separate least-privilege credentials for the new agent.

What this means

Private conversations, task history, or user context may become visible to the new agent and reused across future tasks.

Why it was flagged

The skill instructs enabling all-session visibility for tools, which can expose session context broadly to the newly created agent.

Skill content
"sessions": {
  "visibility": "all"
}
Recommendation

Keep session visibility limited unless the user explicitly approves broader sharing. Document exactly what session data the new agent can access.

What this means

A mistake in parameters or paths could alter OpenClaw configuration, workspace contents, or file ownership.

Why it was flagged

The skill uses local shell commands and direct configuration edits to create and configure the agent. This is central to the stated purpose and includes a backup/JSON validation step, but it is still a high-impact local mutation workflow.

Skill content
Once a new agent request is received, execute in the following order: ... openclaw agents add ${AGENT_ID} ... Update openclaw.json ... chown -R
Recommendation

Review the generated `openclaw.json` changes and backups before restarting the gateway, and validate that the agent ID and paths are safe and expected.

What this means

Tasks and information can flow between the main agent and the new agent after setup.

Why it was flagged

The skill intentionally enables communication between the main agent and the new agent. The allow list is narrow, but it creates a new data-flow boundary users should understand.

Skill content
"agentToAgent": {
  "enabled": true,
  "allow": ["main", "${AGENT_ID}"]
}
Recommendation

Verify the allowed agent list and ensure the new agent’s role, Telegram access, and session visibility match the user’s intended data-sharing boundary.

NoteHigh Confidence
ASI10: Rogue Agents
What this means

The new bot/agent may keep receiving messages and operating until disabled or removed.

Why it was flagged

The skill creates a persistent new agent and external Telegram bot binding. This is disclosed and purpose-aligned, but persistence means it continues to exist after the initial setup.

Skill content
Quickly add a new isolated Agent with a dedicated Telegram Bot.
Recommendation

Install only if a persistent extra agent is desired, and document how to disable the Telegram account, remove the agent, and revoke copied credentials if needed.