Governed Agents

ReviewAudited by ClawScan on May 18, 2026.

Overview

The skill’s purpose is clear, but it should be reviewed because it launches autonomous CLI agents and has an unsafe temporary-directory cleanup pattern that could delete outside its intended area if task IDs are not sanitized.

Only install this if you want an agent to spawn and score other agents. Before use, review the installer, use a low-privilege workspace/account, and avoid custom task IDs or private URLs unless the path handling and network behavior have been tightened.

Findings (6)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

A malformed or attacker-influenced task ID could make cleanup target an unexpected path, risking unintended deletion outside the skill’s temporary working directory.

Why it was flagged

contract.task_id is a writable contract field, but the cleanup path is formed by string interpolation and later recursively deleted without an evident resolve-and-assert containment check under the intended temp directory.

Skill content
task_id = contract.task_id or str(uuid.uuid4())[:8]
task_dir = Path(f"/tmp/governed-{task_id}")
...
shutil.rmtree(str(task_dir), ignore_errors=True)
Recommendation

Use tempfile.mkdtemp or sanitize task IDs to a strict safe pattern, then resolve the cleanup path and assert it remains under a dedicated governed-agents temp root before deleting.

What this means

Installing and using the skill can cause autonomous sub-agents to run commands and modify files within their configured working directories.

Why it was flagged

The skill spawns external agent CLIs and lets Codex run in full-auto mode. This is central to the skill’s purpose, but it is a powerful execution path.

Skill content
cmd = [CODEX53_CLI, "-m", "gpt-5.3-codex", "exec", "--full-auto", prompt]
...
run_result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout + 30, cwd=cwd, env=env)
Recommendation

Use only with clearly scoped contracts, review the working directory, and avoid invoking full-auto sub-agents on sensitive repositories unless you trust the model and task prompt.

What this means

A checked URL can reveal your IP address and the requested URL path/query to that remote server.

Why it was flagged

The grounding gate automatically sends HTTP HEAD requests to URLs found in agent output. The code includes private-IP and scheme checks, but these requests still leave the local machine.

Skill content
urls = _extract_urls(output)
...
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
    return resp.status < 400
Recommendation

Avoid feeding private or tokenized URLs into outputs that will be grounded, and consider adding redirect validation or an allowlist for high-sensitivity environments.

What this means

Sub-agent runs may consume or act through your locally authenticated Codex/OpenClaw accounts.

Why it was flagged

The skill does not forward API-key environment variables, but it does allow Codex/OpenClaw CLIs to use their own local account configuration via HOME.

Skill content
Only the following variables are forwarded: ... `HOME` ...
External CLIs must source their own credentials via their own configuration.
Recommendation

Run with dedicated low-privilege CLI profiles where possible and confirm which local accounts the external CLIs will use.

What this means

Incorrect or manipulated reputation records could affect future agent selection, supervision level, or task blocking.

Why it was flagged

The skill stores persistent reputation state and uses it to affect future supervision decisions, including blocking low-reputation agents.

Skill content
Scores persist in SQLite (`.state/governed_agents/reputation.db`).
...
R ≤ 0.2  →  suspended    (task blocked)
Recommendation

Keep the reputation database in the documented workspace state directory, back it up if important, and reset or inspect it when results look wrong.

What this means

The registry summary may understate what the skill’s own metadata says it can do.

Why it was flagged

SKILL.md declares an installer script and sensitive capabilities, while the registry-provided install/capability summary says there is no install spec and no derived capability tags.

Skill content
install: {"kind": "script", "script": "install.sh"}
capabilities: ["persistent_db_writes", "external_cli_execution", "network_requests"]
Recommendation

Review SKILL.md and install.sh from the source repository before running installation commands, and treat the skill as network-, subprocess-, and persistence-capable.