Claude Agent

• Analyzed: May 15, 2026, 7:16 AM
• Findings: 1
• Version: 2.1.0
• Hash: 0b52ed2a89813d6a0130385272bc2af2cb53c38c2c1f9e227307b1234a82cb5c
• Source: palm
• External report: View on VirusTotal

Findings (1)

The skill bundle is designed to automate the Anthropic 'claude-code' CLI by wrapping it in a tmux session and using Python/Bash hooks for notification and agent wake-up. While the behavior is aligned with its stated purpose as a 'Project Manager' for Claude Code, it possesses high-risk capabilities, including the use of the '--dangerously-skip-permissions' flag to bypass security prompts and the use of 'tmux send-keys' to execute arbitrary shell commands (found in SKILL.md and hooks/start_claude.sh). The instructions in SKILL.md explicitly encourage the agent to handle approvals and iterations autonomously without user intervention, which increases the risk of unmonitored harmful actions if the underlying model is compromised or misdirected. No evidence of intentional malice or data exfiltration to unauthorized third parties was found, but the broad system access and autonomous execution patterns warrant a suspicious classification.