suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
- Location
- scripts/acceptance_rate_analysis.py:47
- Finding
- File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.
AdvisoryAudited by Static analysis on May 10, 2026.
Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Anyone who can access or run the skill may reuse the embedded DataWorks credential, and the agent may query business data under unclear account privileges.
The code contains and uses a fallback access token as an authentication cookie for DataWorks queries, meaning the skill can operate under an embedded account instead of a user-supplied, scoped credential.
DEFAULT_ACCESS_TOKEN = os.getenv("BIGDATA_ACCESS_TOKEN", "manage-[redacted]") ... headers={"Cookie": f"bigdata_access_token={access_token or DEFAULT_ACCESS_TOKEN}"}Remove and rotate the embedded token, require a user-provided BIGDATA_ACCESS_TOKEN secret, declare the credential requirement in metadata, and restrict the allowed API host.
Sensitive business metrics, slices, and query results may remain in local debug logs after the analysis, where they could be read later or included in backups.
Raw SQL metadata and query result rows are logged by default unless DATAWORKS_QUERY_LOG is disabled, creating persistent local copies of retrieved business data.
# 默认写入调试文件 ... if os.getenv("DATAWORKS_QUERY_LOG", "1") ... logger.info("[query_metric_data] 响应原始数据 {}", json.dumps({"sql": data.get("sql"), "column_head_list": column_head_list, "data_list": data_list, "rows": _map_response_rows(...)}, ...))Disable raw response logging by default, redact sensitive fields, document the log location and retention policy, and require explicit user opt-in for debug logs.