Bsc Dev Monitor Skill

• Verdict: Advisory
• Analyzed: May 10, 2026, 7:01 AM
• Findings: 9
• Version: 1.0.1
• Reason codes:
  suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
• Engine: v2.4.23

Overview

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

Findings (9)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse

ConcernHigh Confidence

What this means

Anyone with the package could potentially abuse the exposed ClawHub account, and running the deployment script would use credentials unrelated to normal wallet monitoring.

Why it was flagged

The artifact contains an actual hardcoded ClawHub login password, redacted here, and the script uses it to authenticate and upload a skill.

Skill content

const CREDENTIALS = { email: '[e-mail]', password: '[hardcoded password]' };

Recommendation

Revoke the exposed password, remove account credentials from the package, and use user-specific login/OAuth or environment-managed secrets outside the distributed skill.

ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse

ConcernHigh Confidence

What this means

The payment key could be copied from the skill and misused for billing-related API calls or leaked through URLs/logs.

Why it was flagged

A SkillPay API key is embedded in runtime code and is also placed into generated payment-link query data, exposing payment-provider authority to anyone who can inspect or receive the package/output.

Skill content

apiKey: 'sk_f072…b994b5' ... paymentData = { api_key: SKILLPAY_CONFIG.apiKey, ... }

Recommendation

Rotate the SkillPay key, keep billing secrets server-side, and do not include secret API keys in SKILL.md, source code, or payment URLs.

ASI09: Human-Agent Trust Exploitation

ConcernHigh Confidence

What this means

Users may agree to the skill expecting one price or billing mode and encounter different billing behavior.

Why it was flagged

The runtime code references 0.01 USDT and a per-detection default, while SKILL.md advertises 0.001 USDT per call, making the actual charge behavior ambiguous.

Skill content

price: '0.01', ... billingMode: 'per_call' ... billing_mode = 'per_detection'

Recommendation

Publish one clear billing model and price across SKILL.md, code, metadata, and deployment docs before users install or invoke the skill.

ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

NoteHigh Confidence

What this means

Running deployment helpers could change the local environment or publish/upload code unintentionally.

Why it was flagged

The deployment helper can install a global package and publish the current directory if a user or agent runs it, though no install spec indicates it runs automatically.

Skill content

npm install -g @clawhub/cli ... clawhub publish .

Recommendation

Do not run deployment scripts as part of normal skill use; keep deployment tooling separate, pinned, and credential-free.

ASI10: Rogue Agents

NoteHigh Confidence

What this means

A monitor may keep polling and sending notifications until its duration expires or it is stopped.

Why it was flagged

Creating a monitor starts a repeated background loop. This is purpose-aligned and SKILL.md documents duration/stop controls, but users should notice that monitoring can continue over time.

Skill content

monitorLoop(monitorId); ... setTimeout(() => monitorLoop(monitorId), 10000);

Recommendation

Use bounded durations when possible and explicitly stop monitors you no longer need.

ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication

NoteHigh Confidence

What this means

The configured webhook endpoint can learn which addresses/tokens you monitor and when detections occur.

Why it was flagged

The skill supports automatic webhook notifications to a user-supplied URL, which is expected for alerts but sends monitored-event data outside the skill.

Skill content

"webhook_url": "https://your-server.com/webhook" ... 系统会自动推送

Recommendation

Use only trusted HTTPS webhook endpoints and consider adding webhook signing or authentication.

Findings (9)

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: auto-deploy.js:77
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: BILLING-UPDATE-COMPLETE.md:17
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: billing.js:6
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: index-enhanced.js:13
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: index-updated.js:16
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: index.js:17
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: mock-deploy.js:18
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: README.md:72
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: SKILL.md:12
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.