The Agent Incident Response Playbook: Detect, Contain, Recover, and Learn When AI Agent Systems Fail

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: May 29, 2026, 9:33 PM
• Version:
  1.3.1

Overview

This is a non-executing guide, but it directs users to run live GreenHelix code that can change financial state without strong sandbox, dry-run, or confirmation safeguards.

Review this carefully before installing or following it. Use only sandbox or limited-scope test credentials first, and add dry-run mode, explicit confirmations, rollback steps, and permission limits before allowing the examples to touch production budgets, escrows, webhooks, or reputation data.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 87% confidence
• Finding: The guide encourages copy-paste use of destructive containment code that freezes budgets and cancels escrows without an immediate, prominent safety warning, confirmation step, or dry-run mode. In an incident-response context, operators may execute these actions against production and cause self-inflicted financial disruption, especially because the document repeatedly presents the code as production-ready and directly actionable.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.