Spacelift

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a legitimate Spacelift integration, but it gives an agent broad infrastructure-management power without clear approval guardrails for risky changes.

Install only if you trust Membrane and need agent access to Spacelift. Use a dedicated least-privilege Spacelift account, verify the Membrane CLI package/version before global installation, and require explicit confirmation before deployments, deletions, permission changes, policy edits, credential or secret operations, billing changes, or any non-GET proxy request.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 93% confidence
Finding: The skill explicitly documents direct action execution and proxy API requests, including generic support for POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE, without any safety guidance about confirmation, least privilege, or distinguishing read-only from mutating operations. In an agent setting, this increases the risk of unintended destructive changes to infrastructure-management resources, which can affect deployments, policies, secrets, and production environments.

VirusTotal

63/63 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal