ClawHub

Google Appsheet

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent Google AppSheet integration, but it needs review because it allows full-URL authenticated proxy requests beyond AppSheet-specific paths.

Install only if you are comfortable granting Membrane delegated access to the relevant Google AppSheet account. Prefer discovered Membrane actions, avoid full-URL proxy requests unless the destination is verified as intended, and explicitly approve any create, update, delete, or raw API operation before it runs.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly allows passing a full URL to the proxy request feature, which expands a Google Appsheet integration into a generic authenticated network client. That violates the declared scope of the skill and can enable SSRF-like behavior, access to unintended third-party endpoints, or policy bypass if an agent uses this capability without strict validation.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
Permitting arbitrary destination URLs is not necessary for a skill whose stated purpose is interacting with Google Appsheet data. This broad network capability increases the attack surface substantially because an agent could be induced to make requests to unrelated or sensitive endpoints under the guise of using the Appsheet skill.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal