Flowla

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: May 29, 2026 at 9:36 PM UTC
• Version:
  1.0.1

Overview

This Flowla skill appears legitimate, but it needs review because it permits broad authenticated proxy requests, including full URLs and write/delete-style operations.

Install only if you trust Membrane and need Flowla automation. Prefer prebuilt Membrane actions, avoid full-URL proxy requests unless you have a clear reason, and require explicit confirmation before any write, delete, user, organization, or business-data changes. Protect or revoke the local Membrane credentials when no longer needed.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (1)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: The documentation explicitly permits passing a full URL to the proxy request command, which broadens the skill from a scoped Flowla integration into a generic authenticated network client. That can enable SSRF-style behavior, access to unintended third-party endpoints, or misuse of the Membrane environment to reach resources outside the declared Flowla scope.

VirusTotal

63/63 vendors flagged this skill as clean.