Deputy

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: May 29, 2026 at 9:36 PM UTC
• Version:
  1.0.4

Overview

This is a legitimate Deputy integration, but it gives an agent broad ability to change workforce and payroll-adjacent records without clear approval safeguards.

Install only if you intend to let an agent access your Deputy workspace through Membrane. Use least-privilege Deputy permissions, require preview and explicit confirmation before any write, and verify employee identity, dates, locations, pay-related fields, billing/admin targets, and the exact action before execution.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: The skill description is very broad and can cause the agent to invoke this skill for many ordinary Deputy-related requests without clearly distinguishing read-only tasks from sensitive write operations. In a workforce-management context, overbroad routing increases the chance of accidental employee, schedule, leave, or timesheet changes affecting real business records.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The documentation advertises actions that modify employees, timesheets, leave requests, and shifts but does not warn that these operations change authoritative workforce and payroll-related records. Without clear safety guidance, an agent may treat these actions as routine and perform impactful mutations without sufficient confirmation, validation, or awareness of downstream business consequences.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.