Buildchatbot

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a real-looking BuildChatbot integration, but it lets an agent use authenticated raw API requests that can change or delete chatbot data without clear built-in confirmation safeguards.

Install only if you trust Membrane and intend to let an agent operate on real BuildChatbot data. Use the least-privileged BuildChatbot account available, verify the connection before authenticating, consider pinning or reviewing the Membrane CLI version, and require manual confirmation before any create, update, delete, automation, or raw proxy request.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 90% confidence
Finding: The skill explicitly documents a generic proxy mechanism that supports arbitrary API paths and mutating HTTP methods like POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE without requiring an explicit confirmation or warning before state-changing operations. In an agent setting, this increases the risk of unintended destructive actions, especially when a model falls back to direct API calls instead of safer, narrower predefined actions.

VirusTotal

63/63 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal