Feishu Voice Skill

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it says: converts text to voice and sends it through Feishu, but users should understand it transmits message content to external services.

Install only if you intend to send messages through Feishu. Use least-privilege Feishu app credentials, verify the recipient ID before sending, and avoid sensitive content unless your organization approves both Feishu and the TTS processing path for that data.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
Overly broad trigger phrases like '发语音' or '语音发送' can fire during ordinary conversation, causing the skill to activate unintentionally. In this skill's context, accidental activation could transmit user-provided text to external services (Edge TTS and Feishu), creating privacy leakage and unintended outbound messaging.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The script sends user-supplied text to the TTS engine and then uploads the generated audio to Feishu, but it provides no explicit disclosure, consent prompt, or confirmation before transmitting content off-host. In an agent skill context, this can cause users to unintentionally exfiltrate sensitive text or derived audio to third-party services, especially if the caller assumes processing is local.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal