Agent Reach

PassAudited by VirusTotal on May 11, 2026.

Overview

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: skill-9 Version: 0.1.0 The skill bundle installs a management toolset from a remote GitHub repository (Panniantong/agent-reach) to enable agent access to various social media platforms. It includes high-risk capabilities such as automated extraction of session cookies from local browsers (`--from-browser chrome`) and instructions for the agent to handle sensitive authentication tokens for platforms like Twitter and LinkedIn. While these features are functionally relevant to the stated goal of platform integration, the combination of remote code execution during setup and the handling of sensitive browser data presents a significant security risk.

Findings (0)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

Installing it could execute changing third-party code and install dependencies that were not reviewed in this skill package.

Why it was flagged

The skill directs installation from an unpinned GitHub main-branch archive and then runs an auto-installer for multiple tools, while the registry provides no install spec or code files to review.

Skill content
pip install https://github.com/Panniantong/agent-reach/archive/main.zip
agent-reach install --env=auto
...
`install` auto-detects your environment and installs core dependencies
Recommendation

Only install after reviewing the upstream repository; prefer a pinned release or hash, run in a sandbox, and avoid automatic setup on sensitive machines.

What this means

The agent or installed tools may be able to act as the user on logged-in platforms, and exposed cookies can put accounts at risk.

Why it was flagged

The skill asks for live session cookies and offers automatic extraction from a local browser; those cookies can grant account access, but the artifacts do not clearly bound which sessions are extracted, how they are protected, or how to revoke them.

Skill content
agent-reach configure twitter-cookies "auth_token=xxx; ct0=yyy"
agent-reach configure --from-browser chrome    # auto-extract cookies from local browser
Recommendation

Use dedicated low-privilege accounts, avoid giving main-account cookies, do not use browser-wide extraction unless you understand its scope, and revoke/clear cookies after use.

What this means

If used carelessly, the agent could make public posts or other account actions through authenticated platform tools.

Why it was flagged

The skill encourages direct upstream tool use and documents account-mutating public posting commands, without visible confirmation, scope, or rollback guidance.

Skill content
After setup, call the upstream tools directly — no wrapper layer.
...
mcporter call 'xiaohongshu.publish_content(title: "标题", content: "正文", images: ["/path/to/img.jpg"], tags: ["美食"])'
Recommendation

Require explicit user confirmation before any posting, commenting, liking, uploading, or account-changing action, and keep read-only workflows separate from write-capable tools.

NoteMedium Confidence
ASI10: Rogue Agents
What this means

Tools, services, and credentials may remain on the machine after the initial setup task.

Why it was flagged

The skill discloses persistent tool/config locations and may start services during setup; this appears purpose-aligned, but there is no visible stop, cleanup, or credential-removal guidance.

Skill content
Execute what you can automatically (install packages, start services)
...
Upstream tool repos | `~/.agent-reach/tools/`
Config & tokens | `~/.agent-reach/`
Recommendation

Ask for confirmation before starting services and document how to stop services and remove ~/.agent-reach credentials when no longer needed.