Codex Swarm

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent Codex swarm helper, but it can run autonomous coding agents in the background and push or merge code to your remote repository without a final human approval by default.

Install only if you want autonomous Codex agents to modify and publish code. Prefer running on a fork or protected branch, set SWARM_AUTO_MERGE=false, manually review endorsements and PRs, restrict task IDs to safe characters, and disable external notifications unless you trust the endpoint.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

#
ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation
High
What this means

A failed or incorrect automated review/merge could be pushed to the main branch of the user's remote repository.

Why it was flagged

The integration watcher defaults SWARM_AUTO_MERGE to true and pushes main after automated merge/review steps, creating a high-impact repository mutation without a required final human confirmation.

Skill content
if [ "${SWARM_AUTO_MERGE:-true}" = "true" ]; then
  git push origin main ...
Recommendation

Default SWARM_AUTO_MERGE to false, require an explicit final approval before pushing main, and run this only on protected branches or disposable forks until reviewed.

#
ASI09: Human-Agent Trust Exploitation
Medium
What this means

Users may believe each agent task requires a separate manual endorsement, but the batch path approves tasks automatically.

Why it was flagged

The batch script automatically endorses every task before spawning agents, which weakens the stated endorsement gate as a user-safety control.

Skill content
for i in $(seq 0 $((TASK_COUNT - 1))); do
  TASK_ID=$(jq -r ".[${i}].id" "$TASKS_JSON")
  bash "$SCRIPTS_DIR/endorse-task.sh" "$TASK_ID"
done
Recommendation

Require a manual confirmation or pre-existing endorsement file for each task, and clearly document that batch mode auto-endorses if this behavior is retained.

#
ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse
Medium
What this means

The skill can act through the user's existing repository and GitHub permissions, including publishing changes remotely.

Why it was flagged

Spawned Codex agents are instructed to use the user's local git/GitHub credentials to push branches and create PRs, while the registry metadata declares no primary credential or required environment variables.

Skill content
2. Push: git push origin ${BRANCH}
3. Create PR: gh pr create --fill
Recommendation

Use a limited-scope repository account or fork, ensure branch protections are enabled, and declare the GitHub/git/Codex credential expectations clearly.

#
ASI05: Unexpected Code Execution
Medium
What this means

If task JSON or project/task identifiers come from an untrusted source, they may be able to trigger unintended local shell commands.

Why it was flagged

The script generates and executes a shell runner by interpolating values derived from command arguments/tasks; crafted values containing quotes or shell metacharacters could alter the generated script.

Skill content
cat > "$RUNNER" << RUNEOF
...
cd "$WORKTREE_DIR"
...
codex exec --full-auto -c "model=\$CUR_MODEL" -c "model_reasoning_effort=$REASONING" - < "$PROMPT_FILE"
Recommendation

Validate task IDs, model names, reasoning values, and paths against safe character allowlists, or generate runner scripts using robust shell escaping such as printf %q.

#
ASI10: Rogue Agents
Medium
What this means

Agents and watchers may continue modifying worktrees, committing, reviewing, or pushing after the initial command returns.

Why it was flagged

The skill intentionally launches detached tmux sessions and background watcher processes so agents keep running independently.

Skill content
tmux new-session -d -s "$TMUX_SESSION" ... "bash $RUNNER"
...
bash "$SCRIPTS_DIR/notify-on-complete.sh" ... &
Recommendation

Monitor tmux sessions, use the cleanup script carefully, and run this only in repositories where autonomous background coding is acceptable.

#
ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication
Low
What this means

Task names, batch IDs, and status messages may be sent to third-party chat or webhook services if notifications are enabled.

Why it was flagged

Notifications can be sent to a configured webhook or Telegram bot; this is disclosed and purpose-aligned, but it is an external communication channel.

Skill content
curl -s -X POST "$SWARM_WEBHOOK_URL" ...
curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot${SWARM_TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" ...
Recommendation

Enable notifications only with trusted endpoints and avoid putting secrets or sensitive project details in task IDs or notification text.

#
ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Low
What this means

Users may not realize the skill depends on several local command-line tools and existing CLI authentication until they inspect the instructions.

Why it was flagged

The registry metadata does not declare required tooling, while SKILL.md later requires bash, tmux, git, gh, jq, and codex.

Skill content
No install spec — this is an instruction-only skill. Required binaries ... none.
Recommendation

Declare required binaries and credential expectations in metadata, and review the shell scripts before copying them into a workspace.