手机操控 Agent (蓝蓝版)

SuspiciousAudited by ClawScan on May 10, 2026.

Overview

This skill openly controls an Android phone over ADB, but it gives the agent broad ability to click, type, stop apps, and send messages without built-in confirmation safeguards.

Install only if you are comfortable letting the agent operate your Android phone through ADB. Keep the phone visible, require explicit confirmation before sending messages or making account/financial changes, avoid sensitive screens, clean up temporary captures, and disable USB debugging when finished.

Findings (4)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

The agent could accidentally send a message, click the wrong button, stop an app, or perform actions inside logged-in phone apps as the user.

Why it was flagged

The skill explicitly enables UI input and a message-send workflow. The artifacts do not show a required confirmation step before high-impact actions such as sending messages or manipulating apps.

Skill content
执行 UI 操作:点击、滑动、输入文字、按键 ... 打开 App、搜索联系人、发送简单消息 ... 点击发送按钮
Recommendation

Use only with explicit user direction and add/require confirmations before sending messages, purchases, payments, account changes, app stops, or other irreversible actions.

What this means

Granting this access lets the automation operate the phone with the user's existing app sessions and permissions.

Why it was flagged

ADB USB debugging grants device-level control. This is disclosed and purpose-aligned, but it is a high-privilege mode that can act inside apps already logged in on the phone.

Skill content
⚠️ 需要 USB 调试权限 ... 开启"USB 调试(安全设置)"
Recommendation

Enable USB debugging only for trusted computers, keep the phone visible while operating, and turn off debugging/security settings after use if they are not needed.

What this means

Screenshots or UI text may contain private messages, contacts, notifications, account details, or other sensitive information.

Why it was flagged

The script captures the phone screen and writes it to a temporary local file. UI dumps are similarly pulled from the device, so visible private content can enter local files and the agent context.

Skill content
save_path = tempfile.mktemp(suffix='.png') ... adb(['exec-out', 'screencap', '-p'], binary=True) ... f.write(out)
Recommendation

Avoid using it on sensitive screens, understand where temporary files are saved, and delete screenshots/UI dumps when finished.

What this means

Users have less external provenance information for deciding whether the phone-control code is trustworthy.

Why it was flagged

The supplied registry data does not provide an upstream source or install provenance. This is a note rather than a concern because the reviewed artifacts include the main script and no hidden installer is shown.

Skill content
Source: unknown; Homepage: none ... No install spec — this is an instruction-only skill.
Recommendation

Review the included code before use and prefer skills with a verifiable source repository or publisher history.