Agent Orchestration Kit

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed OpenClaw multi-agent orchestration setup kit with broad but purpose-aligned configuration changes that users should review before applying.

Install only if you want OpenClaw-wide multi-agent orchestration. Review the dry-run output carefully, especially session visibility, internal hooks, heartbeat, agent-to-agent settings, and trusted exec paths; keep the generated backup so you can restore openclaw.json if the configuration is broader than you intended.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The safety section gives mixed signals about networked and external actions: it says 'web_search / web_fetch' is safe to do freely, but also says to ask first for 'Anything that leaves the machine.' In practice, web access inherently sends data off-host, so this ambiguity can cause the orchestrator to autonomously transmit prompts, URLs, tokens in query strings, or workspace-derived context without explicit approval. Because this is the leader role with broad authority to coordinate and summarize owner context, the ambiguity is more dangerous than it would be in a narrower skill.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The invocation guidance is extremely broad, including catch-all phrases like 'anything involving agents working together on tasks,' which can cause the skill to activate outside its intended scope. Overbroad activation increases the chance that powerful orchestration behaviors, config changes, or agent-management flows are introduced in contexts where they were not explicitly requested or appropriately reviewed.

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Content
---

<!-- ORCHESTRATION PROTOCOL — AUTO-INJECTED, DO NOT REMOVE -->

## Task Completion & Callback
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
<!-- ORCHESTRATION PROTOCOL — AUTO-INJECTED, DO NOT REMOVE --> ## Task Completion & Callback After completing a task: 1. **Send callback to Leader:** ``` sessions_send to {Callback to value f

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Content
---

<!-- ORCHESTRATION PROTOCOL — AUTO-INJECTED, DO NOT REMOVE -->

## Task Completion & Callback
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
<!-- ORCHESTRATION PROTOCOL — AUTO-INJECTED, DO NOT REMOVE --> ## Task Completion & Callback After completing a review, you MUST: 1. **Send callback to Leader:** ``` sessions_send to {Callbac

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal