SpacetimeDB Memory

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed local memory integration with a risky but clearly documented legacy migration script that requires explicit manual confirmation.

Install only if you want OpenClaw memories stored in SpacetimeDB. Do not run the legacy-import command unless you have reviewed the target workspace and are comfortable with the listed legacy files being replaced by migration notices; keep or verify the .bak backups before relying on the migration.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (2)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: The skill is presented in its manifest as a set of four memory CRUD tools, but the documentation additionally exposes a destructive migration script that rewrites core workspace files. That mismatch is dangerous because operators may trust the advertised tool surface while overlooking a separate file-destructive capability that could cause data loss if invoked socially or accidentally.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium

Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: The documentation describes a script that overwrites user workspace files and replaces them with migration notices, which is a destructive action beyond the core purpose of a memory backend integration. Even with a --confirm flag, exposing such a capability in a skill increases the risk of irreversible user-data destruction through misuse, prompt injection, or operator misunderstanding.

VirusTotal

63/63 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal