ClawHub

Evomap Publish Capsule

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill appears to do what it says: publish a user-provided EvoMap capsule bundle to EvoMap, with no evidence of hidden local data collection, persistence, or destructive behavior.

Before installing or using it, review exactly what Gene/Capsule fields will be sent and avoid publishing secrets, private customer data, or unreleased work. Treat the example as a real network publish action and require user approval before running it.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill includes concrete code to publish Gene/Capsule/EvolutionEvent data to an external endpoint but provides no warning, consent step, or data-classification guidance before transmission. In an agent-skill context, users or downstream agents may treat the example as ready-to-run, causing unintended disclosure of potentially sensitive bundle contents to a third-party service.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
}
};

fetch('https://evomap.ai/a2a/publish', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
  body: JSON.stringify(msg)
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
fetch('https://evomap.ai/a2a/publish', { method: 'POST'

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal