cursor-agent-cli

PassAudited by VirusTotal on May 11, 2026.

Overview

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: cursor-agent-cli Version: 1.0.0 The skill provides an interface for the Cursor Agent CLI, which features high-risk capabilities including full filesystem access and code modification. Key indicators include the promotion of auto-approval flags like `--force`, `--yolo`, and `--trust` in SKILL.md and EXAMPLES.md, which allow the AI to bypass security confirmations. Additionally, the installation instructions use an insecure `curl | bash` pattern. While these functions are consistent with the tool's stated purpose as an AI coding assistant, the potential for unreviewed, automated system changes via scripts/cursor-agent.sh warrants a suspicious classification.

Findings (0)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

If a user or agent runs these modes carelessly, Cursor Agent could change files or execute development commands without step-by-step approval.

Why it was flagged

The skill explicitly documents a coding agent that can modify code and an auto-approval mode. This is expected for the Cursor Agent CLI, but it is powerful if used on the wrong workspace or without review.

Skill content
| **Agent** | Full access - can modify code | Default | ... # Auto-approve all commands
agent --force "build the feature"
agent --yolo "build the feature"
Recommendation

Use plan/ask mode first, keep sandboxing enabled where possible, specify the intended workspace, and avoid --force/--yolo except in trusted, reviewable environments.

What this means

Running a remote installer gives the downloaded script local execution authority.

Why it was flagged

The install guidance runs a remote installer script directly in the shell. It is user-directed and aligned with installing Cursor, but remote installer pipelines should be trusted and verified.

Skill content
curl https://cursor.com/install -fsS | bash

# Windows PowerShell
irm 'https://cursor.com/install?win32=true' | iex
Recommendation

Install only from Cursor's official site/docs, inspect or verify the installer if possible, and avoid running the command from untrusted networks or copied sources.

What this means

Cursor credentials or API keys may grant account access and should be handled like secrets.

Why it was flagged

The skill documents Cursor authentication and API-key use. This is expected for the provider integration, and the artifacts do not show credential logging or unrelated transmission.

Skill content
export CURSOR_API_KEY="your-key"
agent --api-key "your-key"
...
# Login
agent login
Recommendation

Prefer secure environment-variable or provider login flows, avoid sharing keys or putting them in shell history, and revoke any key that may have been exposed.

What this means

Future Cursor Agent sessions may reuse prior context, including code or prompts the user did not intend to carry forward.

Why it was flagged

The skill documents persistent Cursor sessions that can be resumed. This is a normal feature, but persisted coding context can include sensitive project details or stale instructions.

Skill content
Save important sessions (they auto-save)
...
agent resume
agent --continue
Recommendation

Resume only the intended session, avoid entering secrets, and clear/logout from sessions when working on sensitive projects.

What this means

Unreviewed MCP servers could expose additional tools or data to the coding agent.

Why it was flagged

The skill documents MCP server management and an auto-approve option. MCP integrations are expected in agent tooling, but auto-approval can reduce review of external tool/context boundaries.

Skill content
## MCP (Model Context Protocol) Management

agent mcp

# Auto-approve MCP servers
agent --approve-mcps
Recommendation

Only approve MCP servers you recognize, avoid auto-approval in untrusted workspaces, and review each server's permissions and data access.

NoteHigh Confidence
ASI10: Rogue Agents
What this means

A background agent could make or propose code changes while the user is not actively watching.

Why it was flagged

The skill documents cloud/background execution. This is disclosed and purpose-aligned, but it can continue work outside an interactive local session.

Skill content
## Cloud Agent (Background Execution)

Run tasks in the cloud while you're away:

agent -c "refactor the auth module and add comprehensive tests"
Recommendation

Use cloud mode only for well-scoped tasks, prefer branches or worktrees, and review all generated changes before merging or deploying.