ClawHub

Quack Identity

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill appears to register a Quack identity through a disclosed external service and store the returned local credential, with minor credential-handling cautions.

Install this only if you intend to create a public Quack identity and trust agent-card-builder.replit.app. Treat ~/.openclaw/credentials/quack.json as an API key, avoid sharing terminal output that includes the key prefix, and delete or rotate the credential if you stop using the service.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly states that registration generates credentials and saves them to `~/.openclaw/credentials/quack.json`, but it does not clearly warn the user before invoking the registration flow. Creating and persisting new credentials is a sensitive side effect because users may not expect local secret material to be generated and stored during a seemingly simple registration task.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The script prints a portion of the stored API key to stdout without any warning, confirmation, or masking beyond the first 12 characters. Even partial credential disclosure can leak secrets into terminal logs, CI output, shell history captures, screenshots, or support transcripts, increasing the chance of credential compromise or enabling key correlation attacks.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal