Agent Deploy

Security checks across static analysis, malware telemetry, and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its deployment purpose, but it automatically copies existing API/auth profiles into each new agent and changes persistent agent/Telegram configuration.

Install only if you are comfortable with new agents inheriting existing API credentials. Prefer a dedicated least-privilege profile, verify agent names are simple, and check or clean ~/.openclaw/agents/<id>/agent/auth-profiles.json, workspaces, and config backups when removing agents.

Static analysis

No static analysis findings were reported for this release.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Risk analysis

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

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ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse
High
What this means

A newly deployed agent may inherit API keys or account access intended for the main agent, which could spend quota or access services if the new bot is misused or compromised.

Why it was flagged

The helper copies all global auth profiles and main-agent auth profiles into a new per-agent auth-profiles.json file, giving the new agent broad access to existing provider credentials rather than only the Telegram bot token.

Skill content
global_profiles = config.get("auth", {}).get("profiles", {}) ... main_auth_path = os.path.expanduser("~/.openclaw/agents/main/agent/auth-profiles.json") ... json.dump(merged, f2, indent=2)
Recommendation

Do not copy all credentials by default; prompt the user to select least-privilege profiles, clearly declare credential access in metadata, and clean copied auth files when an agent is removed or a deployment fails.

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ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation
Medium
What this means

Malformed agent names could create unexpected workspace paths, invalid config entries, or routing problems during high-impact config updates.

Why it was flagged

The user-provided agentId is used in filesystem paths and OpenClaw config-key paths, while the script only shows token validation and relies on SKILL.md instructions for the agentId format.

Skill content
AGENT_ID="${1:?Usage: deploy.sh <agentId> <botToken> [workspace_path]}" ... WORKSPACE="${3:-$HOME/.openclaw/workspace-$AGENT_ID}" ... $OC config set "channels.telegram.accounts.$AGENT_ID" "$ACCT_JSON"
Recommendation

Add code-level validation such as ^[a-z0-9-]+$, reject path separators and dots, and fail safely before any backup, directory creation, or config mutation.

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ASI10: Rogue Agents
Low
What this means

The new bot and agent may continue receiving messages and using configured resources until explicitly removed and cleaned up.

Why it was flagged

The skill intentionally creates a persistent, Telegram-reachable agent. This is purpose-aligned, but it remains active after the deployment task.

Skill content
Creates isolated workspace at `~/.openclaw/workspace-<agentId>/` ... Adds routing binding: `<agentId>` -> `telegram:<agentId>` ... Adds Telegram account with the bot token
Recommendation

Track deployed agents, use dedicated bot tokens, monitor the gateway, and remove unused agents and credentials when no longer needed.

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ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Info
What this means

The skill may fail or use whatever local python3/openclaw binaries are on PATH; provenance should be considered before trusting it with agent configuration and credentials.

Why it was flagged

The registry metadata provides limited provenance and no binary requirements even though the skill's documented flow runs bundled shell/Python scripts and the OpenClaw CLI.

Skill content
Source: unknown; Homepage: none; Required binaries (all must exist): none; No install spec — this is an instruction-only skill.
Recommendation

Verify the publisher/source, review the bundled scripts before use, and declare required binaries and capabilities in metadata.