Dangerous exec
- Finding
- Shell command execution detected (child_process).
Security checks across static analysis, malware telemetry, and agentic risk
The skill is coherent for posting to X, but it uses saved Chrome login sessions, explicit anti-bot bypass techniques, and external EXTEND.md settings that can affect profile choice or auto-submit behavior.
Install only if you intentionally want an agent to control a logged-in X account through Chrome. Use a dedicated Chrome profile, inspect any EXTEND.md files, keep preview mode as the default, and require explicit confirmation before publishing.
61/61 vendors flagged this skill as clean.
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
Misuse could publish unwanted public content, trigger account restrictions, or violate platform rules because the tool is designed to look less like automation.
The skill can automate public posting and publishing while explicitly bypassing bot-detection controls, which is high-impact even though it is disclosed and preview is the default.
Posts text, images, videos, and long-form articles to X via real Chrome browser (bypasses anti-bot detection).
Use only with explicit user approval for each post, avoid bulk or unsolicited posting, and consider a separate X account or Chrome profile.
Anyone or any agent workflow using this skill with your saved profile may be able to compose or publish from your logged-in X account.
The skill acts through a persistent local browser session and can use a selected Chrome profile, giving it delegated access to the user's X account.
First run: log in to X manually (session saved) ... `--profile <dir>` | Custom Chrome profile
Use a dedicated Chrome profile with only the intended X account, do not point it at your everyday browser profile, and revoke or clear the profile if you no longer trust the skill.
A project file could change posting behavior or profile selection in ways the user did not intend, including pushing toward automatic submission.
A project-level or user-level EXTEND.md file can influence which browser profile is used and whether posting is automatic, but the artifacts do not show a strict schema, trust boundary, or approval check.
Found | Read, parse, apply settings ... EXTEND.md Supports: Default Chrome profile | Auto-submit preference
Inspect any .baoyu-skills/baoyu-post-to-x/EXTEND.md file before use, disable auto-submit preferences, and require explicit confirmation before any --submit action.
The skill may require accessibility/automation permissions and can paste clipboard contents into a real application window.
The skill uses OS automation commands to send real paste keystrokes. This is disclosed and purpose-aligned for image/article pasting, but it can affect the active application if misdirected.
const result = spawnSync('osascript', ['-e', script], { stdio: 'pipe' });Keep the Chrome window visible, verify the focused app before pasting, and avoid granting broad accessibility permissions unless needed.
The command may fetch or use tooling outside the reviewed skill files, depending on the local setup.
The documented execution path uses npx -y bun rather than a pinned local runtime. This is common for CLI workflows but means runtime resolution depends on the user's environment and package source.
npx -y bun ${SKILL_DIR}/scripts/x-browser.ts "Hello!" --image ./photo.pngInstall Bun from a trusted source, prefer a pinned/local runtime where possible, and verify the reviewed scripts before running them.