AI视频短视频创作器

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: May 29, 2026 at 9:32 PM UTC
• Version:
  1.0.0

Overview

This video-making skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but it should be reviewed because its local scripts can execute broader code and shell commands than the task requires.

Install only if you trust the skill source and will run it in a dedicated project folder. Do not use config.py files or media paths from untrusted sources, avoid sensitive narration text unless you are comfortable sending it to edge-tts, and consider patching the xfade os.system call to subprocess before processing third-party files.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Behavioral AST: exec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands

Findings (5)

os.system() or os exec-family call

High

• Category: Dangerous Code Execution

Content

cmd = cmd.replace(f"OFFSET{i}", f"{offset_val:.2f}")

    print(f"    xfade chain: {n} clips, {n-1} transitions")
    ret = os.system(cmd)
    if ret != 0:
        print("    xfade failed -> fallback to simple concat")
        return concat_simple(clip_paths, output_path, output_dir)

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: ret = os.system(cmd)

Lp3

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 92% confidence
• Finding: The skill clearly instructs the agent to read local files, write outputs, and execute shell commands (`python`, `ffprobe`, FFmpeg) but does not declare corresponding permissions. This creates a transparency and consent gap: a user or platform may not realize the skill can access filesystem contents and launch external tools, increasing the risk of unintended data exposure or command execution in a broader environment.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: The script loads a user-specified config.py via importlib and executes it with exec_module, which means arbitrary Python code in that file runs with the privileges of the current user. In a workflow where config files may be shared, generated, or modified by an agent, this becomes a direct arbitrary code execution vector well beyond simple configuration loading.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The finding correctly identifies that xfade composition is implemented through dynamic shell execution rather than a constrained subprocess API. In a skill that consumes user/project-controlled media paths, this broadens the attack surface from media processing to arbitrary shell command execution if path data is maliciously crafted.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 84% confidence
• Finding: The code sends seg['text'] to edge-tts, which is an external network-backed TTS service path, without any explicit consent prompt, privacy notice, or data-classification check in this script. In this skill context, narration may contain unpublished scripts, proprietary summaries, or sensitive source-derived text, so silent transmission to a third party creates a genuine confidentiality and compliance risk.

VirusTotal

67/67 vendors flagged this skill as clean.