Neolata Memory Engine

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a transparent persistent memory skill with disclosed local storage, optional external providers, and documented cross-agent behavior.

Install only if you want persistent agent memory. Start with local or in-memory mode, avoid storing secrets or regulated data, verify the npm package before installing, scope agents carefully in shared environments, and enable Supabase, external LLM/embedding providers, or webhooks only for destinations you trust.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The guide explicitly states that `context()` searches all agents while using the provided agent only for formatting, which can cause unintended cross-agent data exposure. In an agent-memory product, this is a real confidentiality risk because callers may reasonably assume an agent-scoped context fetch and then inject other agents' memories into prompts, logs, or model calls.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The examples encourage generating prompt-ready context from memories retrieved across all agents without a strong, proximate privacy warning or mandatory scope controls. That combination increases the chance that sensitive data from one agent or user is silently included in another agent's prompt context, creating cross-tenant leakage and secondary exfiltration to external LLM providers.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal