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Security audit

skill-guard

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a real security scanning helper, but its install script can bypass scans and uses unvalidated input in deletion commands, so it needs review before installation.

Install only if you are comfortable reviewing and running a shell script that stages, scans, deletes, moves, and installs skill directories. Avoid --skip-scan and --force unless you fully intend those effects, use only normal ClawHub slugs, and prefer verified package-manager installation for dependencies like uv.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (7)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The skill advertises shell-based usage and installation commands but does not declare any permissions or trust boundaries. Undeclared shell capability increases risk because users or downstream tooling may treat the skill as informational while it actually drives command execution paths during installation and remediation.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The script is marketed as a secure pre-install scanner, yet it intentionally exposes a documented `--skip-scan` path that bypasses the core security control and still installs the skill. This weakens the trust model of the tool and makes accidental or socially engineered insecure installs much more likely.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The header comments claim the script scans skills before installing, but the implementation allows installation without any scan. This is a security-affecting documentation/behavior mismatch because users may rely on the advertised protection and unknowingly deploy unscanned content.

External Script Fetching

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Content
## Requirements

- `clawhub` CLI — `npm i -g clawhub`
- `uv` — `curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh`

## Why This Matters
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
stage_skill() {
    print_info "Fetching $SKILL_SLUG to staging area..."
    
    rm -rf "$STAGING_DIR/skills/$SKILL_SLUG"
    mkdir -p "$STAGING_DIR"
    
    # Install to staging directory (clawhub creates skills/<slug> under workdir)
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
rm -rf "$STAGING_DIR/skills/

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
if [[ -d "$SKILLS_DIR/$SKILL_SLUG" ]]; then
        if [[ -n "$FORCE_ARG" ]]; then
            rm -rf "$SKILLS_DIR/$SKILL_SLUG"
        else
            print_error "Skill already exists at $SKILLS_DIR/$SKILL_SLUG (use --force to overwrite)"
            exit 1
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
rm -rf "$SKILLS_DIR/

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
# Cleanup staging
cleanup() {
    rm -rf "$STAGING_DIR/skills/$SKILL_SLUG" 2>/dev/null || true
}

# Main flow
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
rm -rf "$STAGING_DIR/skills/$SKILL_SLUG" 2>/dev/

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions

Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.

Warn
Code
suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
Location
SKILL.md:22