File share

WarnAudited by ClawScan on May 15, 2026.

Overview

The skill is a disclosed file uploader, but its workspace-only safeguard is flawed, so files outside the intended boundary could be uploaded despite its security claims.

Only install or use this if you are comfortable sending selected files to transfer.whalebone.io. Review file contents carefully, avoid uploading memory or sensitive files unless intended, and prefer a fixed version with robust path validation before relying on the workspace-only safety claim.

Publisher note

Required for safe file uploads from the OpenClaw workspace to external services like transfer.whalebone.io.

Findings (3)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

A file outside the intended OpenClaw workspace boundary could be sent to the file-sharing service if an allowed-looking path or symlink is used.

Why it was flagged

The workspace guard is a simple string-prefix check using abspath, not a resolved common-path check. Sibling-prefix paths or symlinks under the workspace can pass and then be uploaded to the external service.

Skill content
abs_path = os.path.abspath(path_str)
abs_workspace = os.path.abspath(workspace_root)
return abs_path.startswith(abs_workspace)
...
command = ["curl", "--upload-file", rel_path, url]
Recommendation

Use Path.resolve() or os.path.commonpath() with strict boundary checks, reject or resolve symlinks safely, and require explicit user approval before uploading.

What this means

Users may believe the uploader is strictly confined to the workspace when it is not reliably enforcing that boundary.

Why it was flagged

These safety claims are stronger than the implementation supports because the script's path check can be bypassed by prefix-matching paths or symlinks.

Skill content
- Only files within or below the OpenClaw workspace can be transferred.
- The skill prevents directory traversal attacks by validating file paths.
Recommendation

Correct the documentation and implementation so the advertised security boundary matches the actual behavior.

What this means

If a memory or other sensitive file is uploaded, its contents may be accessible to anyone who receives or discovers the returned download URL.

Why it was flagged

The skill explicitly supports uploading OpenClaw memory files, which may contain persistent user or agent context. This is purpose-aligned for a file-sharing skill, but sensitive.

Skill content
- `memory/2026-05-15.md` → Uploads your daily memory file 📝
Recommendation

Review files before uploading, avoid sharing memory files unless intended, and encrypt sensitive files before transfer.