Seedance Video Generation

PassAudited by VirusTotal on May 12, 2026.

Overview

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: seedance-video-generation Version: 1.0.3 The skill bundle is classified as suspicious due to critical vulnerabilities that enable data exfiltration and arbitrary code execution via prompt injection. The `SKILL.md` and `seedance.py` script allow reading arbitrary local files (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`) specified by user input (via `--image`, `--last-frame`, `--ref-images` arguments) and base64 encoding their content, then sending it to `https://ark.cn-beijing.volces.com`. Additionally, the `how_to_send_video_via_feishu_app.md` document describes a `message` tool that reads a local `filePath` and uploads its content to `https://open.feishu.cn`, presenting another data exfiltration vector. The `seedance.py` script also uses `os.system(f'open "{filepath}"')` on macOS for downloaded videos, which could lead to arbitrary code execution if a malicious file URL is provided or injected. These are severe vulnerabilities, but the code does not show clear intent for self-exploitation or malicious behavior without external prompt manipulation.

Findings (0)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

A crafted download path could cause unintended local shell command execution when the generated video is downloaded.

Why it was flagged

After a successful download, the tool automatically invokes a shell command built from the download path. Because the download directory can be user-supplied, shell metacharacters in the path could be interpreted on macOS.

Skill content
if sys.platform == "darwin":
    os.system(f'open "{filepath}"')
Recommendation

Replace os.system with a non-shell call such as subprocess.run(["open", str(filepath)]) or require explicit user confirmation before opening downloaded files.

What this means

If followed, generated videos may be uploaded to Feishu CDN and sent into a chat using configured Feishu app authority, potentially to an unclear recipient.

Why it was flagged

The bundled guide instructs sending generated videos through Feishu using OpenClaw Feishu app credentials. This external chat-upload capability is not part of the skill's stated description or declared credential/capability metadata.

Skill content
message(
  action="send",
  channel="feishu",
  filePath="/root/.openclaw/workspace/seedance_cgt-...mp4",
  message="视频说明文字"
)
...
使用配置在 OpenClaw 中的 `feishu.app_id` 和 `feishu.app_secret`。
Recommendation

Treat Feishu sending as a separate, explicit action: confirm the destination chat/recipient, file path, and user intent before uploading or sending any video.

What this means

The skill needs access to a Volcengine Ark API key to create and manage video-generation tasks.

Why it was flagged

The tool requires an ARK_API_KEY and sends it as a bearer token to the Volcengine Ark API. This is expected for the stated Seedance integration, but the registry metadata says no required env vars or primary credential.

Skill content
key = os.environ.get("ARK_API_KEY")
...
"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_key}"
Recommendation

Use a scoped API key if available, keep it out of shared logs, and ensure the metadata accurately declares ARK_API_KEY as a required credential.

What this means

Prompts and selected images may be sent to Volcengine for video generation.

Why it was flagged

When the user supplies a local image, the tool base64-encodes it and submits it to the external Seedance/Volcengine API as part of the generation request. This is purpose-aligned but involves sending selected local content to a provider.

Skill content
with open(p, "rb") as f:
    b64 = base64.b64encode(f.read()).decode("ascii")
...
result = api_request("POST", BASE_URL, body)
Recommendation

Only provide images and prompts you are comfortable sending to the Seedance/Volcengine service.