Qwen Comic Gen

• Analyzed: May 10, 2026, 6:47 AM
• Findings: 27
• Version: 1.0.0
• Reason codes:
  suspicious.dangerous_execsuspicious.dynamic_code_executionsuspicious.env_credential_accesssuspicious.exposed_secret_literalsuspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
• Engine: v2.4.23

Overview

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.dynamic_code_execution, suspicious.env_credential_access (+2 more)

Findings (27)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

Concern

What this means

Installing it may expose your agent to much more code and instruction material than needed for image generation.

Why it was flagged

The advertised skill is a simple image generator, but the package includes a broad unrelated workspace with other skills, hooks, memory, agents, and scripts.

Skill content

615 file(s): ... AGENTS.md ... memory/... hooks/... skills/feishu-multi-agent-manager/... skills/rag_search/... scripts/autonomous-thinking.js ...

Recommendation

Ask for a minimal package containing only SKILL.md, the reviewed image-generation helper, and declared dependencies; remove unrelated workspace files before installation.

ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse

Concern

What this means

These secrets could grant access to third-party services or accounts and create confusion about which credentials the skill might use.

Why it was flagged

The package contains hardcoded provider, Feishu, and gateway credentials unrelated to the stated Gemini image-generation purpose.

Skill content

`SERPER_API_KEY`, `DASHSCOPE_API_KEY`, `appSecret`, `verificationToken`, and `gateway.auth.token` all have literal values in the file.

Recommendation

Do not publish or install bundles with embedded secrets; rotate the exposed credentials and require users to provide only their own Gemini key through a declared environment variable.

ASI01: Agent Goal Hijack

Concern

What this means

A compatible agent could treat these unrelated instructions as authoritative and change its behavior before handling the user's image request.

Why it was flagged

This root instruction file tells an agent to perform broad workspace setup and memory reads before anything else, unrelated to image generation.

Skill content

Before doing anything else: 1. Read `SOUL.md` ... 2. Read `USER.md` ... 3. Read `memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md` ... Don't ask permission. Just do it.

Recommendation

Remove root-level agent instruction files from the skill package, or scope them so they cannot override the user's task or platform instructions.

ASI06: Memory and Context Poisoning

Concern

What this means

Private context or stored instructions could be pulled into unrelated tasks or reused across sessions without clear user control.

Why it was flagged

The package instructs agents to load and modify persistent memory files, and the manifest includes many memory/profile files.

Skill content

Read `memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md` ... Also read `MEMORY.md` ... You can read, edit, and update MEMORY.md freely

Recommendation

Do not bundle personal memory files with an image skill; keep any memory access opt-in, path-scoped, and clearly documented.

ASI05: Unexpected Code Execution

Concern

What this means

If unrelated hooks or scripts are activated, they could run local shell commands outside the image-generation workflow.

Why it was flagged

The static scan shows shell execution in an unrelated gateway hook; this is beyond the disclosed image-generation helper.

Skill content

execSync(`robocopy "${config.path}" "${backupPath}" /E /COPYALL /R:0`);

Recommendation

Remove unrelated executable hooks from the skill bundle, or require explicit user approval and documentation for any local command execution.

ASI10: Rogue Agents

Concern

What this means

A user could unknowingly install material intended for ongoing background automation rather than a one-shot image tool.

Why it was flagged

The artifact set describes recurring autonomous tasks and memory sync behavior that are not needed for image generation.

Skill content

Cron 任务 ... 每小时知识库索引更新 ... 每天 23:00 晚安记忆同步（OneDrive） ... OpenClaw Cron - 定时任务调度

Recommendation

Exclude cron, heartbeat, multi-agent, and sync configuration from the image skill unless persistence is required, declared, and user-controlled.

Findings (27)

critical

suspicious.dangerous_exec

• Location: hooks/gateway-restart-protection/handler.js:57
• Finding: Shell command execution detected (child_process).

critical

suspicious.dangerous_exec

• Location: scripts/autonomous-thinking.js:193
• Finding: Shell command execution detected (child_process).

critical

suspicious.dangerous_exec

• Location: scripts/triple-line-sync.js:49
• Finding: Shell command execution detected (child_process).

critical

suspicious.dangerous_exec

• Location: skills/send-html-to-feishu/scripts/run.js:41
• Finding: Shell command execution detected (child_process).

critical

suspicious.dynamic_code_execution

• Location: skills/skill-vetting/scripts/scan.py:22
• Finding: Dynamic code execution detected.

critical

suspicious.env_credential_access

• Location: skills/send-html-to-feishu/scripts/send-to-feishu.js:11
• Finding: Environment variable access combined with network send.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: memory/2026-03-08.md:1773
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: memory/2026-03-14.md:55
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: reports/aliyun-embedding-analysis.md:12
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: scripts/debug-search-step.py:21
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: scripts/vectorize-and-store.py:19
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: scripts/vectorize-optimized.py:24
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: search_knowledge.py:22
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: skills/rag_search/TASK_COMPLETION_REPORT.md:178
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: skills/tts-automation/SKILL.md:96
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: test_semantic_search.py:16
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: test_vectorization.py:12
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: test-embedding-api.py:4
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: test-embedding-compare.py:16
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: test-vector-knowledge-flow.py:17
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: vector_query - 副本.py:22
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: vector_query.py:22
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: vectorize_all - 副本.py:27
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: vectorize_all.py:27
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: vectorize_content.py:25
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

critical

suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

• Location: vectorize_knowledge.py:27
• Finding: File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

warn

suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions

• Location: skills/skill-vetting/references/patterns.md:108
• Finding: Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.