MAC OS screenshot to telegram

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: May 28, 2026 at 11:49 AM UTC
• Version:
  1.0.0

Overview

The skill does what it advertises: captures a macOS screenshot and sends it to a Telegram chat, with sensitive privacy implications users should understand.

Install only if you intentionally want OpenClaw to capture your full macOS screen and upload it to Telegram. Before running it, verify the chat ID and profile, make sure nothing sensitive is visible, use a dedicated low-privilege Telegram bot token, and delete the saved workspace screenshot if it contains private information.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (5)

Lp3

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The skill clearly instructs the agent to use shell commands (`screencapture`, `cp`, `grep`, `sed`, `curl`) but does not declare permissions accordingly. That creates a security transparency gap: reviewers and enforcement systems may not realize the skill can capture the screen, read local config, and exfiltrate data over the network.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: This skill captures the user's screen and transmits the image to Telegram, but it does not prominently warn that sensitive on-screen data may be collected and sent to a third party. Because screenshots can contain passwords, messages, tokens, or personal information, the combination of screen capture plus external transmission materially increases privacy and data-exfiltration risk.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The script silently reads a Telegram bot token from the user's local OpenClaw config and uses it for network transmission without any disclosure or confirmation. Accessing credentials from a private config file can surprise users and enables unintended use of a long-lived secret if the skill is triggered inappropriately or repurposed.

Missing User Warnings

High

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: The script captures the user's screen and immediately transmits the image to Telegram with no explicit privacy notice, preview, or confirmation step. Screenshots can contain highly sensitive data such as passwords, messages, tokens, financial details, or internal documents, making silent exfiltration particularly dangerous in an agent skill context.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

3. **Send via Telegram Bot API** (bypasses buggy message tool):
   ```bash
   BOT_TOKEN=$(grep botToken <config-path> | sed 's/.*"botToken": *"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/')
   curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendPhoto" \
     -F "chat_id=<target-chat-id>" \
     -F "photo=@<workspace>/screenshot.png"
   ```

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: https://api.telegram.org/

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.