Zhipu Embeddings

PassAudited by VirusTotal on May 12, 2026.

Overview

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: zhipu-embeddings-v2 Version: 1.0.0 The skill bundle is designed to interact with the Zhipu embeddings API. It implements several security best practices, including using `jq` for safe JSON escaping of user input (preventing injection), enforcing HTTPS with TLS 1.2 for network communication to a legitimate API endpoint (`open.bigmodel.cn`), and providing explicit warnings in `SKILL.md` regarding API key visibility in process lists and safe handling. The `search.sh` script correctly validates input length and handles API errors. There is no evidence of malicious intent, data exfiltration, persistence mechanisms, or prompt injection attempts against the agent.

Findings (0)

Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.

What this means

The agent may make outbound API requests when using this skill.

Why it was flagged

The skill permits shell-based curl and jq usage. That is central to calling the Zhipu API, but it is still network-capable command execution that users should notice.

Skill content
allowed-tools: Bash(curl:*) Bash(jq:*)
Recommendation

Use it only when you intend to call Zhipu, and verify requests stay limited to the documented Zhipu endpoints.

What this means

Anyone who can read or misuse the API key may be able to use your Zhipu account quota or permissions.

Why it was flagged

The script uses a Zhipu API key as a bearer token. This is expected for this provider integration, but it gives access to the user's Zhipu account/API quota.

Skill content
KEY="$ZHIPU_API_KEY" ... -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY"
Recommendation

Use a minimally scoped key if available, keep it out of shared environments, and rotate it if exposed.

What this means

Text you ask to embed may leave your machine and be processed by Zhipu.

Why it was flagged

The user-supplied text is sent to the external Zhipu embeddings API over HTTPS. The destination is disclosed and purpose-aligned, but it creates an external data boundary.

Skill content
TEXT="$1" ... "https://open.bigmodel.cn/api/paas/v4/embeddings" ... -d "$PAYLOAD"
Recommendation

Avoid sending sensitive, private, or regulated content unless you trust Zhipu's handling of that data.

What this means

You may expect live web-search answers, but the included script appears to return embeddings instead.

Why it was flagged

The documentation frames the skill as useful for latest/current information and references an embeddings.sh script, while the provided runnable script is skill/scripts/search.sh and calls the embeddings endpoint. This looks like a documentation/capability mismatch rather than hidden malicious behavior.

Skill content
Use when user asks for web embeddings, latest news, or needs current information. ... ./embeddings.sh "搜索内容"
Recommendation

Verify the actual output and endpoint before relying on it for current news or factual web search.